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I 
THE purpose of this article is to develop, primarily in the context of price- 
fixing and market-division agreements, a general theory of the appropriate 
roles and criteria of the rule of reason and the per se concept in the decision 
of antitrust cases concerning the elimination of competition between agreeing 
parties. 
The topics of antitrust are probably best classified - and the closeness of 
the relationships of phenomena to one another most accurately measured - 
according to the methods by which particular practices are thought to injure 
competition. This results in two major categories, for the theory underlying 
current antitrust law supposes that there are two fundamentally distinct means 
by which competition may be lessened: 
(1) Agreements by which consenting parties remove some or all of the 
competition existing or likely to exist between themselves; and 
(2) Practices by. which one or more parties injure competitors, and thereby 
injure the competitive process itself. 
Agreements in the first group injure consumers directly by enabling the 
parties to restrict output, thus creating misallocation of resources. The theory 
concerning practices in the second category appears to be that by the exclusion 
of rivals parties may gain a market position which will make it profitable 
for them to restrict output.' 
Price fixing and market division, the primary subjects of this paper, thus 
belong to a more general field which includes such related phenomena as agree- 
ments not to compete, concerted refusals to deal not intended to injure rivals, 
and horizontal mergers. The second category consists of such practices as 
*This is the first section of an article to be published in two parts. The second part 
will appear in a forthcoming issue of The Yale Law Journal. 
tAssociate Professor of Law, Yale University. 
1. The idea of injury to competition occurring through injury to competitors is dis- 
cussed in Director & Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 Nw. U.L. REV. 281 
(1956); and in Bork & Bowman, The Crisis In Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 363 (1965). 
The main lines of the theory of injury to competition by agreements eliminating com- 
petition are well established. For a good statement of cartel theory, see McGee, Ocean 
Freight Rate Conferences and the American Merchant Marine, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 191, 
196204 (1960). 
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price discrimination, concerted refusals to deal intended to injure competitors, 
exclusive dealing and requirements contracts, tying arrangements, vertical 
and conglomerate mergers, and growth to large size through efficiency.2 It is, 
in a sense, somewhat artificial to separate these classes of practices since they 
are very often present in the same factual setting and it is impossible to discuss 
the legality of many business arrangements without considering both. These 
two basic methods of injuring competition are, nevertheless, so dissimilar 
analytically that it is desirable to view them separately whenever basic theory 
is under discussion. 
Price-fixing and market-division agreements have been among the primary 
concerns of the Sherman Act 3 ever since its passage. The courts are usually 
represented as having wavered for a time and then settled upon firm rules of 
illegality for such agreements. Price fixing'and market division are, in fact, 
frequently referred to as "hard core" or per se offenses whose legal status, 
as contrasted with that of other practices and agreements cognizable by the 
antitrust laws, is so certain and well known as to justify the use of criminal 
process and sanctions. Yet it is becoming increasingly obvious that even in 
this central area the rules are far from clear. The courts have not succeeded 
in elaborating doctrine which is at once rooted in sound social policy, internally 
consistent, and able to cope comfortably with the problems for which the 
law is expected to supply solutions. Instead, current doctrine shows signs of 
strain and uneasiness which suggest that re-examination of fundamentals 
is due. 
Though they occur in a great variety of business contexts and serve a num- 
ber of purposes, price fixing and market division are merely special forms 
of the general phenomenon of elimination of competition. They are frequently 
explicit, but on economic grounds there seems no reason to-distinguish between 
explicit and implicit eliminations 'of competition. The problem, then, is to 
state general rules by which it may be determined whether particular elimina- 
tions of competition are lawful or unlawful. The- theoretical apparatus of the 
Sherman Act which is supposed to make such distinctions 'is generally known 
as the "rule of reason." Many commentators appear to believe that the rule 
of reason as it applies to loose arrangements eliminating competition has become 
2. This classification is necessarily rough because the law's conventional descriptive 
groupings do not match the operative concepts of injury to competition. A horizontal 
merger, for example, may sometimes be questioned under amended section 7 of the Clayton 
Act not because it eliminates competition between the merging parties but because together 
they may be more efficient (obtain a "competitive advantage") and thus injure rivals. The 
merger, as to that aspect at least, falls within the second category of antitrust rather than 
the first. Conversely, a "conglomerate" merger may be brought within the first category 
when the theory of injury to competition is that the merging parties were potential com- 
petitors. These possibilities of confusion can only be guarded against and not eliminated, 
for the operative concepts of the methods of injuring competition are too necessary to 
analysis, and the conventional descriptive concepts probably too thoroughly established, 
to be discarded. 
3. 26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C. ?? 1-7 (1890). 
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little more than a set of rules of per se illegality.4 Yet this is demonstrably not 
the case. The current shibboleth of per se illegality in existing law conveys a 
sense of certainty, even of automaticity, which is delusive. The per se concept 
does not accurately describe the law relating to agreements eliminating compe- 
tition as it is, as it has been, or as it -ever can be. Alongside cases announcing a 
sweeping per se formulation of the law there has always existed a line of 
cases refusing to apply it. Doubtless some of the cases in the latter' group 
were wrongly decided, but it would be naive to write them all off as simply 
incorrect or aberrational. The persistent refusal of courts to honor the literal 
terms of the per se rules against price-fixing and market-division agreements 
demonstrates a deep-seated though somewhat inarticulate sense that those 
rules, as usually stated, are inadequate. 
. Antitrust's failure to be clear. about the scope and office of the per se concept 
and about the criteria to be used outside the per se area arises from two distinct 
deficiencies: (1) A failure to analyze and select the goals or values the law 
may properly serve; and (2) a failure adequately to appreciate the nature 
of the economic phenomena with which the law must deal. The interaction 
of these two factors has caused. the law to follow an apparently zigzag 
course of development. There has been .on the one hand, a strong line 
of cases apparently holding.. horizontal and vertical price -fixing and 
horizontal market -divisions per se illegal: Trans-Missouri (1897), Joint 
Traffic (1898),. Addyston Pipe & Steel (1898), Dr. Miles (1911), 
Standard Oil (1911), American Tobacco (1911), Trenton Potteries (1927), 
Socony-Vacuum (-1940)., Kiefer-Stewart (1951), Timken Roller Bearing 
(1951), and Parke, Davis (1960). But there has simultaneously existed a line 
of cases opposing or limiting the per se idea: Chicago Board of Trade (1918), 
Standard Oil (Indiana) (1931), Appalachian Coals (1933), Bausch & Lomb 
(1944), National Football League (1953), Denison Mattress (1962), and the 
recent line of Tobacco Warehouse Cases. These cases. are merely leading ex- 
amples of divergent lines of authority which the courts have never satisfactorily 
reconciled. 
A striking display of the law's continuing. theoretical discontinuities is pro- 
vided by the Supreme Court's recent decisions in White Motor Co.5 and Penn- 
Olin Chemical Co.( At issue in the White Motor case were the conditions im- 
posed by White, a -truck manufacturer, in its distributor and dealer contracts, 
that each reseller deal only with customers located within a designated terri- 
tory and that certain customers, reserved for direct sales by White, not be 
dealt with at all. The case thus involved territorial limitations and customer 
allocations, both sub-species of market division. The government won its case 
4. Professor Handler expresses what appears to be the prevailing impression: "The 
authorities upholding loose-knit arrangements are extremely sparse, deal mainly with sui 
generis states of fact, and have little precedential force." HANDLER, ANTITRUST IN PER- 
SPECTIVE 26 (1957). 
5. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963). 
6. United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964). 
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on summary judgment in the district court, but the Supreme Court reversed 
and remanded for trial, splitting five to three on the question of whether the 
contract provisions were violative per se of the Sherman Act. Justice Douglas, 
usually thought of as an advocate of the per se approach, wrote the opinion 
of the Court stating that the case must go to trial since the Court did not 
know enough about the economic significance of White's arrangements to im- 
pose a per se rule at this stage. Justice Brennan concurred separately, offering 
suggestions as to the criteria which might guide the trial. Justice Clark wrote 
for the dissenters: "To admit, as does the petitioner, that competition is elimi- 
nated under its contracts is, under our cases, to admit a violation of the 
Sherman Act. No justification, no matter how beneficial, can save it from that 
interdiction."7 Within itself, then, the White Motor opinion reveals a surprising 
degree of disagreement on the Supreme Court concerning the very funda- 
mental question of whether agreements eliminating competition are justifiable 
under any circumstances. 
Perhaps equally surprisingly, the majority opinion, though it remanded 
the case for full trial, failed to state the criteria by which the category of agree- 
ments illegal per se were to be distinguished from those susceptible of justi- 
fication. The opinion, as will be shown, is somewhat ambiguous: it is capable 
of being read as premised on economic theory or as suggesting that other 
than strictly economic considerations would ultimately play a part in the de- 
cision whether to fashion a per se rule. The dissent's insistence that every 
agreement eliminating competition is illegal seems based entirely on economic 
considerations. Thus the sharp differences displayed within the case may 
arise either from conflicting economic analyses or from disagreement con- 
cerning ultimate values. 
The majority opinion's discontinuity with contiguous doctrinal structure 
is equally dramatic. White Motor involved vertically imposed divisions of 
markets. The Dr. Miles opinion of 1911 had decided that vertical fixing by 
a manufacturer of its dealers' prices was no more lawful than horizontal price 
fixing among the dealers would be. The law has never wavered from this 
position and resale price maintenance continues to be a per se offense. Given, 
also, the law's equation of price fixing and market division,8 it had, prior to 
White Motor, seemed inescapable that vertical market division would be 
7. 372 U.S. at 281 (1963). 
8. Price fixing and market division were treated as equally illegal in United States v. 
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). Since 
then in such cases as United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947) (inter- 
national division of territories), and United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 
150 (1940) (price fixing), they have been generally treated the same. The equation seems 
justified since both price fixing and market division eliminate competition, the former on 
one of the most important terms of sale, the latter on all terms. White Motor seems to 
indicate, however, that vertical price fixing will be viewed more severely by the law than 
vertical market division, and perhaps the same sort of distinction between horizontal price 
fixing and horizontal market division may be perceived recently in such opinions as Deni- 
son Mattress Factory v. Spring-Air Co., 308 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1962). 
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placed in the class of per se violations alongside vertical price fixing. Perhaps 
the Court's refusal to take that step presages a willingness to re-examine its 
approach to both vertical and horizontal price fixing and horizontal market 
division. If not, probably White Motor will ultimately be discarded, for the 
doctrinal fissure it creates seems too glaring to endure long. 
But, if White Motor disclosed disagreement on the Court and discontinuity 
with seemingly entrenched principles, a third and perhaps even more sur- 
prising development was provided by the subsequent Penn-Olin decision, for 
there Justices Douglas and Clark exchanged positions on the very principle 
seemingly at stake in White Motor. Penn-Olin arose on the government's 
challenge, under both amended section 7 of the Clayton Act and section 1 of 
the Sherman Act, of the formation and equal ownership of a joint venture 
corporation, Penn-Olin Chemical Co., by Pennsalt Chemicals Corp. and Olin 
Mathieson Chemical Corp. Penn-Olin was set up to produce and sell sodium 
chlorate in the southeastern United States. Pennsalt was already a producer 
of sodium chlorate and Olin, a large consumer, had considered entering into 
production. The entrance of these very likely competitors into a joint venture 
agreement thus had the effect of eliminating much and perhaps all possibility 
of competition between them in the manufacture and sale of sodium chlorate 
in the Southeast. Justice Clark explicitly recognized this effect,9 and yet, writ- 
ing for the majority, and without even mentioning his position in White Motor, 
held that the record revealed no violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act 
and remanded the case for further investigation of questions he thought pre- 
sented by section 7 of the Clayton Act. Justice Clark offered no explanation 
for his apparent abandonment of his White Motor argument. It is true that 
the agreement eliminating competition was explicit in that case and merely 
inherent in the joining of the parties in Penn-Olin, but it seems impossible 
to believe that Justice Clark rested on a distinction shown to be inconsequen- 
tial by his own reasoning 
Justice Douglas, on the other hand, dissented, essentially on the ground 
that "Agreements among competitors to divide markets are per se violations 
of the Sherman Act.""' Using Sherman Act precedent and reasoning to find 
9. Certainly the formation of a joint venture and purchase by the organizers of its 
stock would substantially lessen competition - indeed foreclose it - as between 
them, both being engaged in commerce. This would be true whether they were in 
actual or potential competition with each other and even though the new corporation 
was formed to create a wholly new enterprise. Realistically, the parents would not 
compete with their progeny.... 
If the parent companies are in competition, or might compete absent the joint 
venture, it may be assumed that neither will compete with the progeny in its line of 
commerce. Inevitably, the operations of the joint venture will be frozen to those 
lines of commerce which will not bring it into competition with the parents, and the 
latter, by the same token will be foreclosed from the joint ventures market. 
378 U.S. at 173 (1964). 
10. Ibid. 
11. Id. at 177. 
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the joint venture violative of section 7 of the Clayton Act, he argued that 
Pennsalt and Olin had joined forces to share the market on the "eve of com- 
petitive projects," and that the case was therefore the same in principle as 
Addyston Pipe & Steel which held a cartel illegal per se.'2 He cited Timken 13 
for the proposition that the elimination of competition could not be justified 
merely because it occurred through a joint venture. Justice Douglas' only 
recognition that the rigid per se analysis adopted here required reconciliation 
with his position in White Motor came in a footnote in which he remarked 
simply that White Motor had concerned "a vertical arrangement involving a 
territorial restriction whose validity we concluded could be determined only 
after a trial, not on a motion for summary judgment."114 If this was intended 
to reconcile Douglas' position in the two cases, it hardly seems adequate to 
the task. Since he had not explained in White Motor any more than in Penn- 
Olin why a vertical arrangement might be different from a horizontal one, the 
footnote in the latter sheds no light on the apparent inconsistency of Douglas' 
positions in the two cases.'5 
In seeking a tenable resolution of the law's conflicts and confusions it will 
be necessary to do more than state an economic theory, for antitrust is law 
as well as economics, and law has its own claims, its own tradition and disci- 
pline. The lawyer, unlike the economist, is forced by his craft to do more 
than understand and describe. He must assess alternatives in order to decide 
what can sensibly be done about particular situations. He must, in addition, 
determine what rules can properly be laid down for the future, which means 
that he must be aware not merely that the facts of the industrial and com- 
mercial world set limits to worthwhile remedies and so to substantive law, but 
also that additional limits for doctrine are set by the processes of warning, ad- 
judication, and enforcement. Even in a predominantly common law field such 
as antitrust the courts should not of course write afresh with each case, for 
the common law itself places great value upon continuity of doctrine. Change, 
in all but exceptional cases, is preferably kept within a given field's existing 
conceptual framework. The Sherman Act's rule of reason, however, as Chief 
Justice White made plain in Standard Oil and American Tobacco,16 rather 
uniquely contains within itself a concept of the desirability and the means of 
change and reform. And, finally, the case law is entitled to respectful attention 
12. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899), cited by Mr. 
Justice Douglas, id. at 178, 180. 
13. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951). 
14. 378 U.S. at 177-78 n.1. 
15. If a difference in prior law could be perceived, it may be that vertically imposed 
price-fixing agreements were viewed even more strictly than the horizontal variety. See 
Oaks & Krane, Resale Price Maintenance by an Integrated Firm: The McKesson & 
Robbins Case, 24 U. CHi. L. REV. 533, 533-34 (1957). The fact that White Motor arose 
on appeal from a grant of summary judgment would not seem in Douglas' view to distin- 
guish it from his analysis of Penn-Olin since the question he was discussing in both cases 
was the applicability of the per se rule. 
16. See text following note 84 infra. 
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as a possible source-of wisdom about policy. Economists have not yet by any 
means completely worked out the application of their theories to all forms 
of market behavior. One must always be alert to the possibility that the dis- 
tinctions and categories of the law, often poorly articulated and seemingly 
divorced from economic theory, may nevertheless reflect a strong practical 
sense of and feeling for the phenomena with which the courts have dealt. The 
law, therefore, may sometimes have suggestions to make to economics, and 
these ought not to be overlooked. 
This article contains two major sections. The first attempts, through an ex- 
amination of key cases, to identify the main themes of policy and of economic 
reasoning in the judicial development of the rule of reason. It also assesses 
the fitness for the law of the policies discerned and suggests that the sole 
appropriate value in this field of antitrust is the maximization of consumer 
want satisfaction. The article's second section attempts an economic analysis 
of the more common forms of price fixing and market division in an effort 
to suggest the considerations which should govern their legality or illegality. 
MAIN THEMES IN THE RULE OF REASON 
In one sense the attempt to isolate and describe the main themes of the 
rule of reason involves a considerable element of arbitrariness, for it, is not 
to be supposed that any of the judges whose opinions are to be discussed 
possessed fully articulated antitrust philosophies which are discoverable through 
close reading. The problems set were often intrinsically difficult under any 
approach and there was not unanimity as to whether the law had wholly 
economic ends or contained a strong admixture of other social and political 
considerations. The main judicial avenues of approach have thus not dis- 
played sharply defined edges. Different judges - and sometimes the same 
judge at different times-have seemed to employ different theoretical appa- 
ratuses. 
Recognizing, then, that any classification is to some extent an artificial 
construct, it still seems useful and legitimate to attempt to arrive at one. The 
cases that came before the courts forced them to make a number of basic 
distinctions, and the necessary implications of those distinctions, whether 
fully present in the minds of their authors or not, may now be discerned 
and may fairly be said to constitute distinct themes or approaches. That theme 
which is here identified as the main tradition of the rule of reason has as its 
strength and dominant characteristic an overriding concern with economic 
values, that is, with the maximization of consumer want satisfaction through 
the most efficient allocation and use of resources. The primary achievement 
of this tradition has been the adoption by the law of a rule of per se illegality 
for cartel agreements.17 Deviant strains in the law have usually been charac- 
17. The word "cartel" is used in this article to mean an agreement or arrangement 
which merely eliminates competition and does not assist in the creation of efficiency. 
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terized by a willingness to give operative significance to conflicting aims, such 
as the welfare of particular producer groups. Failure by both courts and com- 
mentators to recognize the existence of separate themes, defined roughly 
by the values which they implement, has been responsible for much of the 
confusion for which antitrust law is so justly noted. 
Judicial confusion is not entirely to be decried, however. It has been an 
important, functioning part of antitrust. Without it the various dogmas and 
platitudes which occupy so much of the field might have done more damage 
in actual results than they have. Confusion exists within each antitrust strain 
-for none of them have achieved entire philosophical consistency-and also be- 
tween the strains. The latter type of confusion has been especially useful. A 
judge accustomed to working within the dominant stream of antitrust theory, 
that which stresses economic values and the importance and the breadth of 
the per se rules, may be forced to judge an agreement valid under the basic 
policy goals of the main tradition but obviously not capable of being handled 
satisfactorily within its confining verbal formulae. Antitrust's doctrinal con- 
fusion allows the judge to rely, without any real explanation, upon a precedent 
arising from a wholly different theory - one which in the ordinary case he 
would utterly ignore. This tactic accounts for the accordion-like career of 
Justice Brandeis' Chicago Board of Trade opinion. When the rigidities of the 
per se rule seem semantically applicable but also somehow inappropriate 
the court is likely to rediscover Brandeis' vague dicta as the essence of the 
rule of reason. Between times, the case is treated as precedent only for the 
legality of a minor regulation of trading on an organized exchange. Though 
confusion has thus served antitrust well, giving it the flexibility made necessary 
by the individual inadequacy of its various theories, the price has been the 
sacrifice of predictability. Antitrust's need now is coherent generalization which 
will combine the needed degree of flexibility and predictability. 
The decisions of the law's formative period concerning price fixing and 
market division are nowadays usually either ignored altogether or treated 
as mere history. Yet a close examination of them as doctrine is rewarding. 
One of the rewards is the discovery that the conventional view of certain of 
these cases is apparently mistaken and that in this field re-evaluation is due 
both of judicial reputations and of the history of doctrinal development. 
More importantly, the cases of the first several decades of the Act merit 
careful restudy because the courts were then forced to confront and debate 
the law's fundamental policy questions in a more explicit fashion than has 
been common since. Lacking any real guidance from either the language of 
the statute or its legislative history, particularly on the topics under discussion 
here, the courts were forced themselves to legislate in a broad manner and to 
discuss what consistent and useful policy might be. Analysis of the opinions 
they wrote against the factual settings with which they had to deal thus reveals 
something of the inherent nature of the problems with which any body of 
rules in this field must cope. 
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The Establishment of the Main Tradition 
The main tradition of antitrust with respect to price fixing and market 
division was shaped in the law's formative period primarily by three men: 
Justice Peckham, who wrote the Supreme Court's earliest decisions dealing 
with price fixing and market divisions; Judge Taft who, as a court of appeals 
judge, wrote one of antitrust's most suggestive opinions; and Chief Justice 
White who, after a false start in dissenting from Peckham's first opinions, 
recovered to write the 1911 Standard Oil and American Tobacco decisions 
that gave the name "rule of reason" to a position that was essentially Peck- 
ham's. Justice Harlan appears also to have been in this tradition, though his 
inability to articulate his distinctions or to grasp those made by others caused 
considerable unnecessary confusion about both. 
Any assessment of the successes and failures of these jurists, and of those 
of different views, such as Justice Holmes and Justice Brandeis, whose work 
will be discussed separately, must take into account the difficulties they faced. 
One frequently hears talk of the original meaning of the Sherman Act or of the 
intent of Congress in enacting that law, but it can hardly be stressed too 
much that, with respect to the Sherman Act, and particularly with respect 
to loose arrangements of the sort under discussion, such talk of legislative 
intent is more than usually foolish. Congress simply had no discoverable in- 
tention that would help a court decide a case one way or the other. At least 
some of the legislators apparently thought they were enacting the common 
law.18 The language of the first section of the Act employed terms taken from 
the common law, pronouncing unlawful, "Every contract, combination in the 
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce." 
The common law, however, proved of no significant help because it had no 
unitary body of doctrine to which a Sherman Act court could look to find the 
contours of the new statute. The common law precedents were diffuse and 
contradictory, differing from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and often inconsistent 
even within the same jurisdiction.'l The common law concerning restraints 
of trade, moreover, was rooted in very different social policy from any which 
could be relevant to the Sherman Act. The preservation of competition was 
certainly one of the major policies motivating the passage of the Sherman 
Act. But the common law on the topic began, so far as any reported case 
shows, early in the fifteenth century,20 a time when the English courts can 
hardly be supposed to have been aggressively forwarding the idea of compe- 
tition as the regulator of markets. The rule against contracts in restraint of 
trade, by which the early common law meant agreements not to practice a 
trade, was designed primarily to prevent a man from trading away his liveli- 
18. See Dewey, The Common-Law Background of Antitrust Policy, 41 VA. L. REV. 
759 (1955). 
19. See Dewey, supra note 18, and Letwin, The English Common Law Concerning 
Monopolies, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 355 (1954). 
20. Dyer's Case, Year Book, 2 Hen. V., vol. 5, pl. 26 (1415). 
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hood in a society where -extensive governmental- and guild restrictions might 
prevent him from finding comparable employment,21 
Centuries later, -some common law courts, particularly in American juris- 
dictions, did develop concern for competition,22 but their efforts were too spo- 
radic and too heavily contradicted by other decisions to develop any doctrine 
that could be identified as- "the". common law -and made applicable to. the 
Sherman Act. Counsel in the early cases were able to cite common. law prece- 
dent to support virtually any position they took. Probably for this reason, as 
well as the hopelessly anachronistic nature of any attempt to apply concepts 
evolved out of a medieval guild society to a modern commercial nation, the 
Sherman Act courts have never paid much more than lip service to the com- 
mon law. Instead, uninstructed by the statutory text, the legislative history, 
or the common law, the first Sherman Act courts were required by an in- 
scrutable but urgent legislative command to create useful social policy.23 They 
21. Letwin, supra note 19, at 374-75. Parker, C.J., in Mitchel v. Reynolds, (1711) 1 
P.Wms. 181, 24 E.R. 347, 350, stated that a major objection to covenants not to compete 
had been "the mischief which may arise from them, 1st, to the party, by the loss of his 
livelihood, and the subsistence of his family; 2dly, to the publick, by depriving it of an 
useful member." For a collection of materials on the guild system and its impact on this 
area of the law, see HANDLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRADE REGULATION 49-59, 102 
n.1 (1937). 
22. See, for example, the cases discussed by Judge Taft in United States v. Addyston 
Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271, 288-91 (1898). 
23. A contemporary commentator discussing the application of the new statute to 
monopoly offered a conclusion which seems applicable to the entire statute as of the time 
he wrote: "But one conclusion, upon the whole, can be reached. The Act is necessarily 
vague, because, in men's minds, the evil dreaded is vague, and like words, therefore, have 
been used to express it." Dana, "Monopoly" Under the National Antitrust Act, 7 HARV. 
L. REv. 338, 355 (1894). 
It seems clear that the congressional debates provided few firm guidelines to the courts 
who had to build a law about agreements fixing prices or dividing markets. Certainly the 
early cases did not explicitly rely upon any cited congressional determinations. The need 
to preserve competition was a primary theme in the legislative deliberations, but values 
other than competition as a means of protecting consumers - such as the freedom of 
small entrepreneurs and the limitation of essentially governmental economic power in pri- 
vate hands -were also voiced by the Sherman Act's proponents in Congress. In many 
cases these values would lead to the same decision as would concern for consumers, and 
hence would be entirely superfluous to decision making. In other cases, however, they would 
require different results and Congress provided no means of resolving the conflict. It was 
not at all clear, in any event, that most of the legislators regarded such values as in- 
dependent factors to be- weighed by the courts rather than as desirable by-products which 
would often automatically follow from the preservation of competition. For a general 
description of the policy considerations mentioned in the Congress that enacted the Sher- 
man Act and the general muddiness of the legislative intent? see THORELLI, THE FEDERAL 
ANTITRUST POLICY 225-32 (1954). 
Even allowing for the truth in Justice Frankfurter's remark that "the fair interpretation 
of a statute is often 'the art of proliferating a purpose,' . . . revealed more by the demon- 
strable forces that produced it than by its precise phrasing," Universal Camera Corp. v. 
NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 489 (1951), the task facing the courts with respect to section 1 of 
the Sherman Act was arguably unduly legislative in nature. The problem of the proper 
response of the courts to such a problem is discussed at pages 829-47 infra. 
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proceeded to discharge this delegated function with what appears in retrospect 
to have been considerable skill. 
Justice Peckhamn's Rule of Reason 
Despite the near universal opinion that Chief Justice White fathered the 
modern rule of reason in his 1911 Standard Oil24 and American Tobacco 25 
opinions,26 a careful reading of Justice Peckham's opinions indicates that the 
honor of paternity belongs instead to him. It is difficult to account for the 
common assessment of Peckham as a mere literalist who advocated an un- 
workably rigid interpretation of the statute 27 except as due to an excessive 
reliance upon verbal formulations. Peckham's seemingly literal reading of the 
statute was probably a tactic in his debate in 1897 with White over the con- 
struction of the new statute. White then advocated a position very different 
from that he espoused as the "rule of reason" in 1911. The point at issue in 
the Peckham-White debate, though White seems then to have misunderstood 
it, was not whether the Act should be flexible or rigid but by what criteria 
its flexibility should be controlled. 
The occasion for this debate was the Trans-Missouri decision,28 the first 
case in which the Supreme Court was called upon to apply the Sherman Act 
to a price-fixing agreement. The government had brought a bill to enjoin the 
Trans-Missouri Freight Association and eighteen member railroads from 
agreeing upon rates and other terms of service upon designated rail traffic.29 
The case was complicated by the requirement of the Interstate Commerce- Act, 
which it was not suggested defendants had violated, that all railroad rates, 
however arrived at, be "reasonable and just."30 At the hearing on the bill and 
answer defendants' allegations that they had charged only reasonable rates 
were taken as true. The circuit court dismissed the bill, holding that, though 
contracts which eliminated healthy competition were to be condemned, those 
which "go to the extent only of preventing unhealthy competition, and yet 
at the same time furnish the public with adequate facilities at fixed and reason- 
able prices and are made only for the purpose of averting personal ruin" are 
lawful.31 A two-judge majority in the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the 
24. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
25. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911). 
26. This view is so general in the literature today that citation of individual statements 
to that effect seems not only superfluous but misleading. 
27. See, for example, HANDLER, ANTITRUST IN PERSPECTIVE 4-7 (1957). 
28. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897). 
29. The agreement allowed individual roads to charge rates below those set by the 
Association, but provisions for advance notice of rate reductions, collective reductions by 
other roads to meet individually lowered rates, and similar procedures, seemed calculated 
to discourage rate cutting. 
30. 24 Stat. 379 (1887). 
31. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 53 Fed. 440, 451 (C.C.D. Kan. 
1892). The judge quoted a Michigan decision with approval: "The public is quite as much 
interested in the prosperity of its citizens in their various avocations as it can possibly be 
in their competition." Id. at 452. 
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dismissal, agreeing that relevant precedent supported "the proposition that 
it is not the existence of the restriction of competition, but the reasonableness 
of that restriction, that is the test of the validity of contracts that are claimed to 
be in restraint of trade."32 This reasonable-price interpretation of the statute's 
meaning represented at that time a not uncommon view of federal judges who 
had occasion to apply the law,33 and seems very nearly to have carried the 
Supreme Court itself. Peckham led the majority in a five-to-four decision 
holding the dismissal of the bill error.34 White and the minority apparently 
accepted the railroad's argument that only unreasonable restraints were out- 
lawed by the statute and that reasonableness was defined by the reasonableness 
of the rates they had agreed upon. Since the Interstate Commerce Commission 
had found the rates reasonable, the argument went, defendants' restraint of 
trade was necessarily reasonable and the government's bill properly dismissed. 
Peckham's "literal" reading of the statute - his insistence that the Act 
could not be read to legitimate a category of "reasonable" restraints since it 
outlawed "every" restraint - appears to have been largely a tactic to defeat 
White's version of the law, not the result of a simple-minded application of 
the statutory language.35 Certainly Peckham was not opposed to flexibility 
32. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 58 Fed. 58, 72 (8th Cir. 1893). 
The opinion stated that while contracts whose main purpose was the suppression of com- 
petition might be illegal, it did not follow that it was unlawful to make agreements whose 
main purpose was "to so regulate competition that it may be fair, open, and healthy, and 
whose restriction upon it is slight, and only that which is necessary to accomplish this 
purpose." Id. at 69. 
The dissenting judge agreed that this was the general rule but contended that a stricter 
one applied to railroads. He attemped a distinction between private parties engaged in such 
pursuits as "the manufacture or sale of lumber, dry goods, or other like articles," to whom 
the majority's rule would apply, and two classes of persons to whom a more stringent 
rule forbidding all agreements restricting competition applied, namely private parties deal- 
ing in "staple commodities" or "articles of prime necessity," and corporations, such as rail- 
road companies, engaged in work of a public nature. Id. at 87. This judge identified cor- 
porations engaged in work of a public nature as those whose duties "require in their per- 
formance the exercise of the sovereign right of eminent domain" but did not indicate how 
one might distinguish a staple commodity or article of prime necessity from such frivolities 
as dry goods and lumber. Id. at 86. 
33. See, for example, in addition to the lower court opinions in Trans-Missouri, the 
opinions in Dueber Watch Case Mfg. Co. v. E. Howard Watch & Clock Co., 55 Fed. 851 
(C.C.D.N.Y. 1893), aff'd, 66 Fed. 637 (2d Cir. 1895); and Gibbs v. McNeeley, 102 Fed. 
594 (C.C.D. Wash. 1900), rev'd, 118 Fed. 120 (9th Cir. 1902). Among the distinctions 
suggested in the Dueber Watch Case opinion in the Court of Appeals were the reason- 
ableness of the price fixed, whether the goods affected were articles of prime necessity, 
whether the parties had market power, whether the restraint was general or partial, and 
whether the parties merely bound themselves or tried to force others to agree. 
34. Besides Peckham, the majority consisted of Chief Justice Fuller and Justices Har- 
lan, Brewer, and Brown. The minority consisted of Justices White, Field, Gray and Shiras. 
35. The contribution of the government's argument to Peckham's solution is prob- 
lematical. The government's brief urged that the Sherman Act was not controlled by the 
common law and that Congress had "imposed on the courts no duty of inquiry as to rea- 
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in application of the law, for, as will be seen, he introduced a sophisticated 
power of discrimination into the law in his definition of the term "restraint 
of trade." His real objection to White's test of "reasonableness" was based 
on the criteria that test, as White and the lower court judges framed it, 
would have imported into the Act.36 To avoid that construction it was an 
obvious maneuver for Peckham to resort to the statutory text: 
sonableness or justifiability, but condemned all restraints. . . . [T]he prevention of com- 
petition, entire or partial, is a restraint of the trade or commerce in which it exists." Brief 
for the United States, United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897), 
p. 31. Taken literally, this view would require a complete per se rule against the elimina- 
tion of competition. Later the brief seemed to offer a less drastic approach, arguing that 
the principles relating to monopoly were relevant and that one of monopoly's chief evils 
was the destruction of competition and the consequent prevention of the operation of or- 
dinary commercial causes upon prices. This seems to call for illegality only when the 
parties control the market. Id. at 38. The brief suggested, in a passage adumbrating 
Brewer's concurring opinion in Northern Securities, see note 112 infra, that an agreement 
eliminating competition between railroads was not only the same wrong as ordinary trusts 
and combinations but was "in fact more harmful in effect, though the same in principle, 
because it is easier to stifle competition which is limited by natural laws. When but little 
competition is possible, such as there is becomes all the more important and should be the 
more jealously guarded." Id. at 39. The brief argued the case also under the alternative 
theory that the common law did control the statute and suggested a formulation resembling 
that later adopted by Judge Taft. See text accompanying notes 64-82 infra. 
36. Defendants' briefs may only have increased Peckham's doubts about the possibility 
of using the common law to give meaning to the statute. In arguing that the Sherman 
Act, if it incorporated the common law, was too vague to be constitutional, appellees said: 
The truth is that the term "contracts in restraint of trade" does not designate any 
class of unlawful contracts, but only a class of contracts concerning the legality of 
which questions arise. Some of them are unlawful while others are not; and whether 
any particular one is unlawful depends upon whether or not it is contrary to public 
policy. This is the only test. 
Brief for Appellees, p. 33. But then, arguing in the alternative under the theory that the 
common law was controlling, appellees said that the test was reasonableness, which means 
"what is agreeable to reason." Id. at 65. What was "agreeable to reason" at common law, 
and hence under the statute, turned out to be both such subsidiary contracts as the agree- 
ment not to compete by the seller of a business and those in which the restraint itself was 
the main object, including "those contracts the object of which is to restrain or regulate 
competition." Id. at 69. The latter fell into three categories: (1) Contracts between persons 
dealing in prime necessities which from natural causes are limited in supply (viewed strict- 
ly by the law); (2) contracts between persons making or dealing in ordinary commodities 
whose supply can be increased by others if the price is kept high (Here, the law regards 
the agreement as innocent if it appears that the purpose was simply to maintain fair and 
reasonable prices. But even here the agreement will be regarded with greater jealousy if 
it relates to a commodity which is a prime necessity of life.); and (3) combinations be- 
tween persons exercising public franchises with the view of restricting or regulating com- 
petition. (Here the law fixes the price of the service rendered in the absence of an agree- 
ment as to what is reasonable.) Id. at 69-70. 
Applying the third category to the case before the court, the brief contended: 
The question, therefore, turns upon the nature and results of competition in the busi- 
ness of railroad transportation; what the benefits of such competition are, what evils, 
if any, are incident to it, whether it is competent to the parties engaged in it as 
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When, therefore, the body of an act pronounces as illegal every contract 
or combination in restraint of trade or commerce among the several 
States, etc., the plain and ordinary meaning of such language is not limited 
to that kind of contract alone which is in unreasonable restraint of trade, 
but all contracts are included in such language, and no exception or limi- 
tation can be added without placing in the act that which has been 
omitted by Congress.37 
He concluded that an agreement fixing rates was a contract in restraint of 
trade and, therefore, was illegal regardless of the supposed reasonableness of 
the rates established. 
Peckham was by no means content, however, to rest his construction of the 
statute entirely upon its text. He also argued persuasively against a reasonable- 
price standard because "the subject of what is a reasonable rate is attended 
with great uncertainty"38 so that it would be "exceedingly difficult to formulate 
even the terms of the rule." Moreover, "even after the standard should be 
determined there is such an infinite variety of facts entering into the question 
of what is a reasonable rate" that the effort of making a case would be so 
rivals to seek by voluntary agreement to avoid such evils, and whether the means 
employed in the present instance are reasonably calculated to repress such evils, or 
to restrict the benefits of competition. 
Id. at 71-72. 
Though this test seemed to require that every price-fixing case be conducted by under- 
taking a complete industry study and be concluded with a legislative judgment by the 
court, counsel really had a simpler solution to offer, since, they contended, reasonable 
prices were assured in this industry by the law which required rates to be reasonable and 
in other industries by the fact that any attempt to increase prices to an unreasonable point 
would attract new capital, increase the supply, and lower the price. Id. at 115-16. This 
seemed to mean that all agreements to fix prices would be lawful except in those rare cases 
in which the supply of the product was absolutely fixed. Having been forced through this 
welter of categories and metaphysical distinctions to learn that almost all cartels are law- 
ful, Peckham and the other justices of the majority might justifiably have concluded that 
the common law did not have a great deal to offer the Sherman Act. 
37. 166 U.S. 290, 328 (1897). 
38. What is the proper standard by which to judge the fact of reasonable rates? Must 
the rate be so high as to enable the return for the whole business done to amount 
to a sum sufficient to afford the shareholder a fair and reasonable profit upon his 
investment? If so, what is a fair and reasonable profit? That depends sometimes on 
the risk incurred, and the rate itself differs in different localities: which is the 
one to which reference is to be made as the standard? Or is the reasonableness of 
the profit to be limited to a fair return upon the capital that would have been 
sufficient to build and equip the road, if honestly expended? Or is still another 
standard to be created, and the reasonableness of the charges tried by the cost of 
the carriage of the article and a reasonable profit allowed on that? And in such case 
would contribution to a sinking fund to make repairs upon the roadbed and renewal 
of cars, etc., be assumed as a proper item? Or is the reasonableness of the charge 
to be tested by reference to the charges for the transportation of the same kind of 
property made by other roads similarly situated? If the latter, a combination among 
such roads as to rates would, of course, furnish no means of answering the question. 
166 U.S. 290, 331-32 (1897). 
1965] THE RULE OF REASON 789 
enormous as to defeat the action.39 He effectively demonstrated, in fact, that 
the question of what is a "reasonable" rate is a foolish one for a court to ask 
because the only meaningful answer is the rate set by competition.40 Peckham 
made yet another policy argument against a reasonable-price standard, stating 
that the mere power to affect prices, when achieved by agreement, should be 
illegal because it might be used not only to raise prices but to lower them 
to the detriment of small competitors of the cartel.41 
In Trans-Missouri Peckham gave a brief but highly suggestive indication 
of his "rule of reason" when, though he insisted that every restraint of trade 
was illegal, he indicated that 
A contract [by the vendor of business property not to enter into the same 
kind of business for a certain time or within a certain territory] which 
is the mere accompaniment of the sale of property, and thus entered into 
for the purpose of enhancing the price at which the vendor sells it, which 
in effect, is collateral to such sale, and where the main purpose of the 
whole contract is accomplished by such sale, might not be included within 
the letter or spirit of the statute in question.42 
Since this passage indicated that a contract clearly classified as one "in re- 
straint of trade" at the common law might not even be "within the letter" of 
the statute, it should have served notice that Peckham was reinterpreting that 
familiar phrase to fit the different role of the statute.43 
White, in his dissenting opinion seemed, as did many commentators after- 
ward, to miss the significance of Peckham's remark and to suppose that it was 
really only a rather fatuous blunder that revealed the emptiness of Peckham's 
attempt at a "literal" construction of the statute. White asked rhetorically, 
But how, I submit, can it be held that the words "every contract in re- 
straint of trade" embrace all such contracts, and yet at the same time it 
be said that certain contracts of that nature are not included? The asserted 
exception not only destroys the rule which is relied on, but it rests upon 
no foundation of reason.44 
39. [A]ny individual shipper would in most cases be apt to abandon the effort to show 
the unreasonable character of a charge, sooner than hazard the great expense in 
time and money necessary to prove the fact, and at the same time incur the ill will 
of the road itself in all his future dealings with it. To say, therefore, that the act 
excludes agreements which are not in unreasonable restraint of trade, and which 
tend simply to keep up reasonable rates for transportation,' is substantially to leave 
the question of reasonableness to the companies themselves. 
166 U.S. 290, 332 (1897). 
40. Id. at 339. Peckham utterly' ignored White's thrust that, if the reasonableness of 
rates were impossible of ascertainment, a very odd light was cast upon a recent judgment 
of the Court upholding an ICC determination that certain rates were unreasonable. Id. at 
373. Perhaps his silence suggested that it was one thing when Congress had legislated an 
essentially nonsensical standard which the Court must perforce apply and quite another 
when the Court was free to choose. 
41. Id. at 323. 
42. Id. at 329. 
43. Elsewhere in the opinion it was suggested that the term might have a different 
meaning in the statute. Id. at 313. 
44. Id. at 352. 
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Yet it should have been possible to see, even in Trans-Missouri, that Peckham 
was redefining "restraint of trade" to refer to the elimination of competition 
in the general market. This represented a groping toward a standard - far 
more sophisticated than White's fuzzy notion of "reasonable" prices - capable 
of separating two very different classes of agreements eliminating competition: 
thus, the contrast between an agreement collateral and subordinate to the sale 
of property and an agreement between railroads to set rates. One was prob- 
ably perceived as very unlikely to affect competition generally; the other as 
almost certain to. This, and other reasoning in the opinion, shows that Peckham 
accepted the preservation of competitive markets as a main purpose of the 
statute.45 He appears to have framed a rule very much like that of per se 
illegality for cartel agreements. He said of the agreement between the rail- 
roads that "there can be no doubt that its direct, immediate, and necessary 
effect is to put a restraint upon trade or commerce as described in the act" 
and that it was therefore illegal "no matter what the intent was on the part 
of those who signed it."146 
The preservation of competition was not the sole value Peckham saw in the 
Act, however. As already noted, he feared the power of a combination to set 
low prices as much as its power to set high prices. The basis for this fear was 
concern for small traders and also, perhaps, a belief that the statute's goals 
could properly include the social and political as well as the economic well- 
being of the nation.4 Peckham here sounded complex themes which echo 
45. Thus, when meeting the argument that, because the railroads had the right to 
charge reasonable rates under the Interstate Commerce Act, they had the right to agree 
with competing roads to maintain such rates, Peckham said that what one road might do 
was radically different from agreeing with competing roads to keep rates up. "Competition 
will itself bring charges down to what may be reasonable, while, in the case of an agree- 
ment to keep prices up, competition is allowed no play." 166 U.S. 290, 339 (1897). Though 
in Trans-Missouri he never explicitly defined "restraint of trade" as a cartel agreement 
to eliminate competition from the general market place, that was the working concept he 
kept coming back to. 
46. Id. at 342. 
47. High prices Peckham feared for the sake of the public, but he was not consistent 
about his reasons for fearing low prices. He argued that business or trading combinations 
may even temporarily, or perhaps permanently reduce the price of the article 
traded in or manufactured, by reducing the expense inseparable from the running of 
many different companies for the same purpose. Trade or commerce under those 
circumstances may nevertheless be badly and unfortunately restrained by driving 
out of business the small dealers and worthy men whose lives have been spent there- 
in, and who might be unable to readjust themselves to their altered surroundings. 
Mere reduction in the price of the commodity dealt in might be dearly paid for by 
the ruin of such a class and the absorption of control over one commodity by an 
all-powerful combination of capital. 
166 U.S. at 323. 
In thus preferring a society of "small dealers and worthy men," even if it were neces- 
sary to forego lowered costs and even permanently lowered prices to retain them, Peck- 
ham foreshadowed Justice Brandeis and the modern developments of the policies he ad- 
vocated. See text at pages 815-28, 832-33 infra. 
Peckham distinguished, perhaps not entirely consistently, between the dislocations and 
personal misfortunes which were the "inevitable accompaniment of change and improve- 
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through antitrust to this day. It is important that these themes should have 
been raised in the first price-fixing case in the Supreme Court, for that estab- 
lishes their ancient lineage in antitrust, and that Peckham gave them voice, 
for that shows that not even antitrust's main tradition has been entirely con- 
sistent. The per se rule and concern for competition, as will be seen, are likely 
to prove incompatible with an attempt to further social and political values 
in the same statute, if the latter values are given operative significance.48 Their 
expression together in this opinion demonstrates that anti-trust's lack of policy 
clarity is as old as the statute. Peckham belongs in the main tradition, however, 
because though he expressed other values, he nevertheless employed a per se 
rule keyed to the economic values of competition. 
Of White's dissent very little more need be said. He argued, as already 
noted, that the Act employed a reasonable price standard. He did not suggest 
how a reasonable price was to be identified. Such a rule, uniformly applied, 
would have permitted unlimited cartelization with judicial supervision of 
price levels. White supported his position, however, by arguing that a law 
which struck down all contracts which restrained trade or the freedom of traders 
regardless of their reasonableness would outlaw "all those contracts which are 
the very essence of trade, and would be equivalent to saying that there should be 
no trade, and therefore nothing to restrain."49 He thus lumped together the main 
contending themes of the rule of reason: the idea that some contracts are 
necessary to trade, though they may also eliminate some amount of competi- 
tion; and the very different notion that some general suppression of compe- 
tition might be desirable in itself. That he was prepared to have the Sherman 
Act judge the latter as well as the former is shown by his contention that 
Peckham's reading of the statute would forbid combinations of working men 
to obtain increased wages or shorter hours of labor. He noted that combinations 
of laborers had only been excepted from the common law prohibition of con- 
tracts or combinations in restraint of trade "either by statutory exemption 
ment" (he cited the change from stage coaches and canal boats to railroads, the change 
from hand labor to machinery, and from machines operated by hand to those operated by 
steam) and those "effected by combinations of capital whose purpose in combining is to 
control the production or manufacture of any particular article in the market." Id. at 
323. But again he turned to the damage that might be done by low prices: 
[1It is not for the real prosperity of any country that such changes should occur 
which result in transferring an independent business man, the head of his establish- 
ment, small though it might be, into a mere servant or agent of a corporation for 
selling the commodities which he once manufactured or dealt in; having no voice in 
shaping the business policy of the company, and bound to obey orders issued by 
others. 
Id. at 324. 
Peckham thus vacillated between fear of the power of a combination to restrict output 
and raise prices and fear of the power of a combination to achieve efficiencies and lower 
prices. The result, in cartel cases at least, was to lead him to denounce the mere existence 
of power to fix prices achieved by agreement of competitors. 
48. See text at page 838 infra. 
49. 166 U.S. at 351. 
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therefrom, or by the progress which made reason the controlling factor on 
the subject."50 This implied that courts as well as legislatures can decide 
what producer groups are to be preferred to consumers. 
White seems, therefore, to have been willing for courts, in determining 
reasonableness under the Sherman Act, to make major policy judgments of 
a sort usually reserved for the legislature. This was something more than the 
courts were forced to do in any event by the vagueness of the Sherman Act, 
for he seemed to envision not the evolving of a firm set of criteria which 
Congress could then examine once and accept, modify, or reject, but rather a 
continuing process of choice between social philosophies by judges, a con- 
tinuing determination of whether competition or cartelization was desirable 
in the particular case, and a continuing regulation of cartel behavior. This, ap- 
parently, was what White meant in 1897 by the "rule of reason."'5' His differ- 
ences with Peckham were clearly fundamental, though perhaps not fully 
grasped on either side, and the narrow victory of the latter in the Trans- 
Missouri case probably had immense importance to the future evolution of 
the law. 
That Peckham was not committed to an unworkably broad per se approach, 
but was in fact employing a rule of reason, though he did not of course use 
that term, became still clearer in his opinion the following year in the Joint 
Traffic case.52 The case involved a railroad rate-fixing agreement indistinguish- 
able in principle from that declared illegal in Trans-Missouri.53 This fact dic- 
50. Id. at 356. 
51. It is sometimes suggested that White's dissent in Trans-Missouri should be in- 
terpreted as doing no more than making a sort of primary jurisdiction point: the I.C.C. 
having held the fixed rates reasonable under the Interstate Commerce Act, it was improper 
for the courts to hold them invalid under the Sherman Act. Under this view White's dis- 
sent really expressed no general construction of the Sherman Act. This interpretation 
seems unconvincing, however, particularly since White attacked the application of Peck- 
ham's rule to non-railroad situations as likely to prove disastrous and insisted upon the 
necessity of a rule of reason in those cases as well. It is true that he did not specify what 
the rule of reason should be in other cases but he accepted the reasonable rate argument 
in the case before him and did not indicate that this was restricted to that case. Rather 
the presence of the ICC determination appeared to be regarded merely as a fortuitous 
means of arriving at reasonableness in that particular situation. This view is strengthened 
by White's failure to disavow the lower court interpretations of reasonableness in the 
same case. These clearly envisaged application of the reasonable-price test to all indus- 
tries. Another piece of evidence pointing in the same direction is that subsequently in 
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899), Peckham said that even 
if reasonableness of price were a defense the prices fixed there were unreasonable. Id. at 
235. (This was not inconsistent with Peckham's general position on the reasonable price 
defense because it was uniquely possible in Addyston to make such a finding. See note 79 
infra.) White joined the majority opinion. It seems quite possible that Peckham included 
the point about unreasonableness of prices, otherwise unnecessary in his interpretation of 
the law, to bring along the Trans-Missouri dissenters. 
52. United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898). 
53. The agreement, between thirty-one railroads comprising most of the lines between 
Chicago and the Atlantic coast, was described in its preamble as designed "to establish 
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tated defense counsels' tactics: a frontal assault upon the rationale of Trans- 
Missouri. Defendants contended that the reading there given the statute would 
outlaw the most ordinary and indispensable contracts and consolidations. This 
had been a main point of White's dissent in the prior case and perhaps counsel 
hoped to detach at least one member from the five-man majority by spelling 
out the supposed implications of their prior decision. The majority held firm, 
however, and again Peckham wrote the opinion. He listed the transactions de- 
fendants said his reasoning would make unlawful: (1) "[T]he formation of a 
corporation to carry on any particular line of business"; (2) "a contract of 
partnership"; (3) "the appointment by two producers of the same person to 
sell their goods on commission"; (4) "the purchase by one wholesale merchant 
of the product of two producers"; and (5) "the lease or purchase by a farmer, 
manufacturer or merchant of an additional farm, manufactory or shop."54 
Peckham answered, after pointing out that no such case was before the Court, 
that such transactions would be difficult to bring within the statutory cate- 
gory of "restraints of trade." Counsel had also said that Trans-Missouri's 
construction of the Act would render illegal "all organizations of mechanics 
engaged in the same business for the purpose of limiting the number of persons 
employed in the business, or of maintaining wages."55 Peckham, however, 
simply ignored this illustration in his rebuttal. Certainly the application of 
the statute to trade unions might have given him difficulty.56 Nevertheless, 
it seems significant that, of all the examples advanced by counsel, Peckham 
at least provisionally excluded from the category of "restraints of trade," as 
he defined it, those which were cases of consolidation or fusion, while the 
only example he listed but failed to comment upon involved the elimination 
of competition by agreement but lacked any other element of consolidation 
or fusion.57 
and maintain reasonable and just rates, fares, rules and regulations on state and interstate 
traffic, to prevent unjust discrimination and to secure the reduction and concentration of 
agencies and the introduction of economies in the conduct of the freight and passenger 
service." Existing rates, fares, charges, and rules were reaffirmed but changes were to be 
recommended by the association's managers and the railroads were obligated to follow the 
recommendations so made. Individual roads could deviate only upon resolutions of their 
boards of directors. The machinery for such deviation as well as the agreement's direction 
to the managers upon receiving the required notice of such a resolution "to act promptly 
upon the same for the protection of the parties hereto" were calculated to discourage failure 
to follow the recommendations. 
54. 171 U.S. at 567-68. 
55. Id. at 567. 
56. Trade unions are of course the same economic phenomenon as cartels, but they 
were not illegal in the United States at that time and it was certainly clear that in passing 
the Sherman Act Congress had not intended to destroy the union movement. For a nar- 
rative of the Court's difficulties in attempting to accommodate the existence of unions and 
collective bargaining to the contrary philosophy of the antitrust laws, see GREGORY, LABOR 
AND THE LAW ch. VIII (1946). 
57. This distinction might have given Peckham difficulty in merger cases, and perhaps 
it explains his vote with Holmes in Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 
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The Joint Traffic opinion made it even clearer that by "restraint of trade" 
Peckham meant the elimination or suppression of competition in the general 
market, for, in defending the statute's constitutionality he asked rhetorically: 
"Has not Congress . . . the power to say that no contract or combination shall 
be legal which shall restrain trade and commerce by shutting out the operation 
of the general law of competition?"58 
Peckham's rule of reason, therefore, was one which outlawed those agree- 
ments whose purpose or effect was to suppress competition in the general 
market but to uphold those whose elimination of competition was collateral 
and incidental to another end the parties were pursuing. From the illustrations 
discussed, that other end which legitimated the elimination of competition 
between the parties seemed usually to be some form of consolidation or merger 
of their productive activities. 
Peckham's rule, however, may not have been all of one piece. Mention has 
already been made of his suggestion in Trans-Missouri that the Sherman Act 
might embody social as well as economic policy. He did not there face the 
197 (1904). But it is plausible to read the language of Joint Traffic as outlawing mergers 
under Section 1 if their purpose or effect was to restrain commerce: 
[T]he statute applies only to those contracts whose direct and immediate effect is 
a restraint upon interstate commerce.... The effect upon interstate commerce must 
not be indirect or incidental only. An agreement entered into for the purpose of 
promoting the legitimate business of an individual or corporation, with no purpose 
to thereby affect or restrain interstate commerce, which does not directly restrain 
such commerce, is not, as we think, covered by the act, although the agreement may 
indirectly and remotely affect that commerce. 
171 U.S. at 568. 
The test of "direct and immediate" as opposed to "indirect and incidental" seems to be 
merely a rephrasing of the opposition of "direct, immediate, and necessary" to "collateral" 
or "incidental" which the Trans-Missouri opinion sometimes used in place of the distinc- 
tion between restraint and non-restraint. 
58. Id. at 569. Throughout the Joint Traffic opinion "restraint of trade" is assumed 
to consist of stifling competition in the market. Thus, also in connection with constitution- 
ality, Peckham framed the issue as Congress' power to prohibit, as in restraint of inter- 
state commerce, an agreement entered into for the purpose of maintaining rates, and he 
explained that "The agreement affects interstate commerce by destroying competition and 
by maintaining rates above what competition might produce." Id. at 569. 
Later, in Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899), Peckham 
articulated still more clearly the distinction he had been making ever since Trans-Missouri. 
He stated that it was a restraint of trade, and therefore unlawful 
where the direct and immediate effect of a contract or combination among particular 
dealers in a commodity is to destroy competition between them and others, so that 
the parties to the contract or combination may obtain increased prices for them- 
selves.... 
Id. at 244. But, paraphrasing Anderson, he said: 
when it is seen that the agreement entered into does not directly relate to and act 
upon and embrace interstate commerce, and that it was executed for another and 
entirely different purpose, and that it was calculated to attain it, the agreement 
would be upheld, if its effect upon that commerce was only indirect and incidental. 
Ibid. 
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question of which policy should take precedence where the two came into 
conflict. Perhaps, therefore, his talk of non-economic values was mere rhetoric, 
without operative significance in the law. That theme, however, recurred in 
Peckham's opinion in the Anderson case 59 upholding an agreement by mem- 
bers of an association not to deal with non-members. Defendants, members of 
the Traders' Live Stock Exchange, were speculators at the Kansas City stock- 
yards, buying cattle and then either reselling upon the same market or re- 
shipping to other markets. They agreed not to deal with any other yard traders 
who were not Exchange members and not to deal with any commission mer- 
chant who dealt with a non-member. Peckham accepted the claim that the 
association had no explicitly pecuniary aims but was devoted to such ends 
as the improvement of standards of business integrity. The ultimate rationale 
of the decision is not entirely clear. Peckham mentioned, seemingly as determi- 
native factors, that the Exchange was open to all yard traders who would abide 
by its rules and that there was a large market for cattle wholly apart from 
defendants. He did not discuss the problem that would exist if the Exchange 
expanded so that there was no important market outside its membership. 
Perhaps even then he would have found it lawful. But at times the main 
thrust of his reasoning appears to have been that the association was not 
aiming at the suppression of competition: 
If an agreement of that nature, while apt and proper for the purpose 
thus intended, should possibly, though only indirectly and unintentionally, 
affect interstate trade or commerce, in that event we think the agreement 
would be good. Otherwise, there is scarcely any agreement among men 
which has interstate or foreign commerce for its subject that may not 
remotely be said to, in some obscure way, affect that commerce and to 
be therefore void.60 
The decision may not, therefore, reflect a belief that some values, such as the 
improvement of business morals, justify the elimination of competition. A 
decision based upon such a belief would of course rest upon a standard indis- 
tinguishable from White's test of reasonableness which Peckham had em- 
phatically rejected. It appears more likely that Peckham did not analyze an 
agreement to use only "ethical" business tactics (as defined by the interested 
parties) as an elimination of competition of the same sort as an agreement 
fixing prices.6' 
This view is consistent with Peckham's reference to the restraint in Anderson 
as "indirect." The test of "direct" and "indirect" in Anderson and the com- 
panion Hopkins case62 replaced the earlier dichotomy of restraint and non- 
59. Anderson v. United States, 171 U.S. 604 (1898). 
60. Id. at 616. 
61. This seems an error because an agreement not to compete in ways that the parties 
define as "unethical" is like an agreement not to compete in price in that its primary pur- 
pose and effect is to remove one form of competition between the parties without any com- 
pensating fusion of their productive efforts or other gain in efficiency. 
62. Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578 (1898). 
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restraint employed in Trans-Missouri and Joint-Traffic.63 Like the earlier test. 
that of direct and indirect was a means of distinguishing between agreements 
whose primary purpose and effect was the suppression of competition in the 
general market and those whose purpose was something else but which would, 
just as any economic behavior would, inevitably have some side effect upon 
the market. 
Peckham, then, was an important figure in the development of the Sherman 
Act, which is to say, in the formation of basic anti-trust policy. He deserves 
a better reputation than he has been accorded. If he did not work out a com- 
pletely consistent and fully developed rule of reason, neither has anyone else, 
and Peckham made the attempt with no significant guidance either from Con- 
gress or preceding judicial tradition. He devised, nonetheless, a version of the 
statute whose distinctions were keyed to the policy of preserving competition 
in the general market while permitting those agreements and cooperative en- 
deavors which are useful in the promotion of industrial and commercial effi- 
ciency. His insistence that the statute, by outlawing "every" restraint of trade, 
did not enact the common law saved the Sherman Act from a stultifying effort 
to incorporate a body of confused and inappropriate precedent. His rejection 
of a reasonable-price standard of legality may have saved the statute from the 
futility of becoming a judicially-administered version of the National Industrial 
Recovery Administration. Given the enormous administrative difficulty of the 
task, the result of such a misstep would surely have been the effective retire- 
ment of the courts from the field, except perhaps for the occasional policing of 
conduct that seemed particularly predatory or "unfair." He thus helped to 
prevent the statute from becoming a license to cartelize. Perhaps even more 
important, he helped to shape a statute which became, and for a long time 
remained, the politically potent symbol of the free and unregulated market. 
Whatever the shortcomings of his opinions and his articulation of their ra- 
tionale, at a crucial point in antitrust history Peckham and the four justices 
who joined him made the right decision. 
Judge Taft: The Concept of Ancillarity 
After Trans-Missouri but before any additional clarification of its meaning 
by the Supreme Court, Judge Taft, as he then was, in his opinion for the 
Sixth Circuit in Addyston Pipe & Steel,64 made an ambitious attempt to 
provide the Sherman Act with a workable formula. 
63. In the Trans-Missouri and Joint Traffic opinions Peckham had occasionally used 
phrases similar to "direct" and "indirect." See note 57 supra. Perhaps the reason for shift- 
ing more consistently to the direct-indirect phraseology from that of restraints and non- 
restraints was the awkwardness of denying that agreements known to the common law as 
in restraint of trade (such as the agreement not to compete collateral to the sale of a busi- 
ness) were restraints of trade under the Sherman Act. The Trans-Missouri phrasing 
seemed to contradict what every common lawyer knew, while that of Anderson, though 
the same in substance, defied no accepted categories of speech or thought. 
64. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 1898). 
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The case came up on the government's appeal from the circuit court's dis- 
missal of its petition in equity charging six manufacturers of cast-iron pipe 
with an agreement to fix prices and divide territories. Defendants attempted 
to avoid the effect of Trans-Missouri by arguing that its strict rule applied only 
to quasi-public corporations such as railroads and that the statute applied a 
common-law test of reasonable prices to their agreement. Taft elected to side- 
step the task of interpreting Trans-Missoziri and to meet defendants upon the 
ground of the common law. It seems reasonable to suspect that he chose this 
more difficult route because it gave him a way of joining in the dispute between 
the Peckham and White wings of the Supreme Court and offering, in the 
guise of an interpretation of the common law, and without a directness that 
might have seemed presumptuous in a lower court judge, a construction of the 
statute that avoided both what may have seemed to him Peckham's excessive 
rigidity and White's excessive fluidity. 
According to Taft, the common law held void agreements in restraint of 
trade whose sole purpose was merely to restrain competition but upheld those 
which were merely subordinate to the accomplishment of another purpose. 
Admitting the existence of a contrary line of cases at the common law, and 
disposing of them as incorrect on policy grounds, he necessarily, though not 
explicitly, addressed himself to and refuted the rule of reason urged by White: 
It is true that there are some cases in which the courts, mistaking, as we 
conceive, the proper limits of the relaxation of the rules for determining 
the unreasonableness of restraints of trade, have set sail on a sea of doubt, 
and have assumed the power to say, in respect of contracts which have 
no other purpose and no other consideration on either side than the 
mutual restraint of the parties, how much restraint of competition is in 
the public interest, and how much is not.65 
Like Peckham, Taft thought, "The manifest danger in the administration of 
justice according to so shifting, vague, and indeterminate a standard would 
seem to be a strong reason against adopting it."66 Earlier in the opinion he had 
said that in cases where restriction of competition is the sole aim of the agree- 
ment, "there is no measure of what is necessary to the protection of either 
party, except the vague and varying opinion of judges as to how much, on 
principles of political economy, men ought to be allowed to restrain compe- 
tition."67 
To provide a standard Taft offered, supposedly from the common law, the 
concept of ancillary restraints. To be lawful an agreement eliminating compe- 
tition must be ancillary - that is, subordinate and collateral to another legiti- 
65. Id. at 283-84. The fact that Taft recognized that his gloss on the common law, 
considered as description, was partial and inaccurate perhaps provides an additional in- 
dication that he was interested in that law not so much for guidance as for a means 
of preserving the judicial proprieties while lecturing the Supreme Court on the proper 
means of construing the Sherman Act. 
66. Id. at 284. 
67. Id. at 283. 
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mate transaction and necessary to make that transaction effective. This supplied 
certainty, for the "main purpose of the contract suggests the measure of pro- 
tection needed, and furnishes a sufficiently uniform standard by which the 
validity of such restraints may be judicially determined."68 Taft offered from 
the common law some suggestions as to restraints considered valid because 
ancillary to lawful main transactions or purposes: 
[A] greements 
(1) by the seller of property or business not to compete with the buyer 
in such a way as to derogate from the value of the property or business 
sold; 
(2) by a retiring partner not to compete with the firm; 
(3) by a partner pending the partnership not to do anything to inter- 
fere, by competition or otherwise, with the business of the firm; 
(4) by the buyer of property not to use the same in competition with 
the business retained by the seller; and 
(5) by an assistant, servant, or agent not to compete with his master 
or employer after the expiration of his time of service."" 
Though there is good reason to doubt that all of the listed agreements should 
be considered legal under the Sherman Act,70 Taft's third example - the agree- 
ment of partners not to compete with the partnership during its existence- 
is particularly suggestive. Like Peckham's list of non-restraints in Joint Traffic, 
it involves a consolidation or merger. Taft rationalized its validity at common 
law in policy terms directly applicable to modern antitrust: 
. . . [W]hen two men became partners in a business although their union 
might reduce competition, this effect was only an incident to the main 
purpose of a union of their capital, enterprise, and energy to carry on 
a successful business, and one useful to the community. Restrictions in 
the articles of partnership upon the business activity of the members, 
with a view of securing their entire effort in the common enterprise, were, 
of course, only ancillary to the main end of the union, and were to be 
encouraged.7' 
Taft very prudently did not limit the possible valid ancillary restraints to 
the five listed,72 and, later in the opinion, he did suggest the application of the 
ancillarity concept to a vertical arrangement in order to distinguish a case 
cited by defense counsel from the Addyston fact situation. In the cited case, 
Chicago, St. L. & N. 0. R. R. v. Pullman Southern Car Co.,73 the Supreme 
Court had upheld at common law a contract by which a sleeping-car company, 
Pullman Southern, had agreed to do all the sleeping-car business of a railroad 
but exacted the condition that no other sleeping-car company be permitted to 
68. Id. at 282. 
69. Id. at 281. Paragraphing added. 
70. See Section II of this article. 
71. 85 Fed. at 280. 
72. "It would be stating it too strongly to say that these -five classes of covenants in 
restraint of trade include all of those upheld as valid at common law...." Id. at 282. 
73. 139 U.S. 79 (1891). 
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engage in that business on the same line.74 Taft justified this vertical arrange- 
ment in terms very similar to those he had used in connection with the part- 
nership agreement: 
The main purpose of such a contract is to furnish sleeping-car facilities to 
the public. The railroad company may discharge this duty itself to the 
public, and allow no one else to do it, or it may hire someone to do it, 
and, to secure the necessary investment of capital in the -discharge of the 
duty, may secure to the sleeping-car company the same freedom from 
competition that it would have itself in discharging the duty. The restraint 
upon itself is properly proportioned to, and is only ancillary to, the main 
purpose of the contract, which is to secure proper facilities to the public.75 
Apparently the vertical or horizontal form or appearance of the relationship 
did not control for Taft the applicability of his formula. Here, as in the part- 
nership illustration, the agreement eliminating competition was viewed as 
essential to protect a continuing cooperative effort by the parties.76 
The passage quoted suggests another recurrent theme in antitrust by offering, 
seemingly as a justification of the exclusive arrangement with the sleeping-car 
company, the observation that the railroad company could have offered the 
sleeping-car service itself and allowed no one else to do it. This raises the 
question - though only to assume the answer - of whether it should always 
be lawful to accomplish by contract results that may lawfully be attained by 
ownership. That, of course, is one way of stating the entire problem of price 
fixing and market division. 
Despite their differences in verbalization, Taft's and Peckham's rules of 
reason are obviously very similar. Taft's non-ancillary restraint is the same 
thing as Peckham's restraint of trade (or direct restraint) a cartel agree- 
ment. Taft's ancillary restraint was the same thing as Peckham's non-restraint 
(or indirect restraint) - an agreement eliminating competition ony incidentally 
to the accomplishment of some other purpose sought by the parties. Taft, 
74. It was then customary for the sleeping car company not only to retain title to its 
cars when in use on the line of a railroad but to furnish the services that were required 
in the cars. 
75. 85 Fed. at 271. 
76. Taft also relied upon some less fortunate distinctions of the Pullman Southern 
case. One was that, in any event, it would be 
quite difficult to conceive how competition would be possible upon the same line of 
railway between sleeping car companies .... 
Id. at 287. The car company, however, had thought competition sufficiently possible to 
require an agreement against it and the law usually does not ask for more proof of the 
possibility of competition than that. Taft's other distinctions were still worse: 
The public interest is satisfactorily secured by the requirement, which may be en- 
forced by any member of the public, to wit, that the charges allowed shall not be 
unreasonable, and the business is of such a public character that it is entirely sub- 
ject to legislative regulation in the same interest. 
Id. at 287-88. The first of these is decidedly peculiar for a judge who has just been in- 
veighing against the "sea of doubt" which courts embark upon when they attempt to deter- 
mine how much restriction of competition is reasonable, and the second suggested rationale 
would have required a different outcome in the recently decided Trans-Missouri case. 
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like Peckham, said that the form of the agreement would not save its legality 
if its actual purpose was to suppress competition generally.77 It is not clear 
whether either of them would have upheld an ancillary restraint, to use Taft's 
terminology, by parties controlling a dominant share of the industry. Such 
a restraint would have been substantially the same as a merger of a dominant 
portion of the industry, and, since the Sherman Act for years was uncertain 
about the legality of monopoly by merger in the absence of abusive or predatory 
practices,78 it is hardly surprising that neither Peckham nor Taft undertook 
to settle the problem in the context of the cartel cases before them. Taft did 
say that market power was not essential to illegality in cartel cases.79 
The modern law generally holds naked or non-ancillary agreements fixing 
prices or dividing markets illegal without more, as Taft thought the law should, 
but his attempt to establish a category of lawful ancillary restraints has 
had much less success. This aspect of his doctrine has remained undeveloped 
and its possibilities unexploited.80 This is probably because, in the ultimate 
analysis, Taft, like Peckham, did not himself avoid the "sea of doubt." He 
was unable adequately to define the main purpose which would justify a sup- 
porting elimination of competition beyond the general description that it was 
"the enjoyment of the legitimate fruits of the contract" or protection from 
"the dangers of an unjust use of those fruits by the other party."'81 By sweeping 
the problem under the labels "legitimate" and "unjust" this statement did 
77. But, in recent years, even the fact that the contract is one for the sale of property 
or of business and good will, or for the making of a partnership or a corporation, 
has not saved it from invalidity if it could be shown that it was only part of a plan 
to acquire all the property used in a business by one management with a view to 
establishing a monopoly. Such cases go a step further than those already considered. 
In them the actual intent to monopolize must appear. It is-not deemed enough that 
the mere tendency of the provisions of the contract should be to restrain competition. 
In such cases, the restraint of competition ceases to be ancillary, and becomes the 
the main purpose of the contract, and the transfer of property and good will, or the 
partnership agreement, is merely ancillary and subordinate to that purpose. 
85 Fed. 271 at 291. 
78. Compare, for example, Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 
(1911), and United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911), with United 
States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920), and United -States v. Inter- 
national Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693 (1927). 
79. 85 Fed. 271 at 291. To be safe, however, Taft found that defendants had market 
power and that the prices they fixed were unreasonable. Id. at 291-93. The finding that the 
prices charged were unreasonable does not cut against his "sea of doubt" argument, for 
Taft pointed to the letters from the manager of one of the foundries pointing out that it 
could- make what it considered a reasonable profit at prices approximately $7 or $8 less 
per ton than those set by the association. Taft might also have pointed to the discrepancy 
in prices between areas where defendants competed and areas where their agreement was 
in effect to demonstrate the unreasonableness of the prices in the latter area. 
80. The absence of the language of ancillarity from later decisions seems particularly 
odd since all of the Circuit Court of Appeals judges who participated in the Addyston 
decision - Harlan and Lurton were the other two - eventually sat on the Supreme Court. 
81. 85 Fed. at 282. 
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much to seem to justify the common objection that any restraint can be called 
ancillary. 
Taft's accomplishment in suggesting a structure for the new law was, 
nevertheless, a considerable one. The main outlines of his solution, though 
perhaps virtually identical to Peckham's, were offered with much greater 
elaboration and in clearer language.82 His doctrine of ancillary restraints offered 
the Sherman Act not content but form: a method of preserving socially valuable 
transactions by defining an exception to an otherwise inflexible prohibition of 
agreements eliminating competition, and a formula for confining the exception 
to the area of its reason for existence. 
Chief Justice White's 1911 Rule of Reason 
Chief Justice White's opinions in the 1911 Standard -Oil and American 
Tobacco cases must certainly rank among the most artful in antitrust. They 
were, of course, merger and monopolization cases, but White took them as 
occasions to expound the structure of the law generally. Their main fault- 
and it is a grievous one-is that they were capable of being, and were, so 
thoroughly misunderstood that many people believed the Supreme Court had 
changed the substance of the Sherman Act.88 This was due not only to Harlan's 
violent and mistaken dissent but also to the notorious opacity of White's prose, 
as well as to his use of the phrase "rule of reason" to signify a set of criteria 
wholly opposed to those he had indicated by the same term in his 1897 Trans- 
Missouri dissent. 
Yet the need for a restatement of the law must have seemed compelling. 
Peckham's opinions had been largely misunderstood, causing widespread ap- 
prehension in the business community. After that, the famous debate between 
Harlan and Holmes in the 1904 Northern Securities case must have suggested 
that the law was either unintelligible or unworkable, or both.84 The major 
82. It is difficult to guess how much Peckham and Taft may have influenced each 
other. Addyston came after Trans-Missouri but the latter opinion by itself may have given 
little guidance as to Peckham's complete solution. It seems unlikely, therefore, that Peck- 
ham influenced Taft. On the other hand, there is no indication of influence running the 
other direction. After Addyston Peckham did not deviate from the position he had taken 
in Trans-Missouri; he continued to insist that the statute precluded any test of reasonable- 
ness and sought to achieve flexibility through definition of the phrase "restraint of trade." 
It seems likely that Peckham and Taft worked out their formulae independently, in- 
fluenced less by one another than by the nature of the phenomena with which the law they 
were making had to deal. 
83. The sharp and widespread dissatisfaction withb what was erroneously conceived to 
be the Court's abandonment of Peckham's "literal" reading of the Sherman Act and its 
supposed assumption of the legislative power to determine how much competition is in the 
public interest is well known. See, for example, the authorities cited in HANDLER, ANTI- 
TRUST IN PERSPECTIVE (1957) Ch. I, notes 5, 6, 8, and 9, particularly Montague, Anti- 
Trust Laws and the Federal Trade Commission, 1914-1927, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 650, 651-54 
(1927). Montague, however, -expresses a minority view on the literary quality of the 1911 
opinions: "the highest emotion they stir is a mild thrill to the sonority of Chief Justice 
White's prose style. Great music is like that." Id. at 651. 
84. See text accompanying notes 104-12 and 117-30 infra. 
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virtues of the Standard Oil and American Tobacco opinions, moreover, are 
numerous. The business community was reassured by the introduction of the 
phrase "rule of reason" that not every consolidation was unlawful; the Act 
was related in a plausible manner to the common law without being controlled 
by it; a dynamic principle was built into the rule of reason so that the law 
could change as economic understanding progressed; and, finally, the sub- 
stance of the law as worked out by Peckham was articulated in new form but 
brought forward substantially without change. 
White began by saying that the terms of the Sherman Act - restraint of 
trade, attempt to monopolize, and monopolization - "at least in their rudi- 
mentary meaning, took their origin in the common law, and were also familiar 
in the law of this country prior to and at the time of the adoption of the act 
in question."85 He therefore proposed to examine not the complicated body of 
precedent built up at common law but "the elementary and indisputable con- 
ceptions of both the English and American law on the subject prior to the 
passage of the Anti-trust act."86 In a passage crucial to his reasoning White 
said: 
The evils which led to the public outcry against monopolies and to the 
final denial of the power to make them may be thus summarily stated: 
1. The power which the monopoly gave to the one who enjoyed it to 
fix the price and thereby injure the public; 2. The power which it engen- 
dered of enabling a limitation on production; and 3. The danger of de- 
terioration in quality of the monopolized article which it was deemed 
was the inevitable resultant of the monopolistic control over its production 
and sale.87 
Gradually, according to White, in this country as in England the name of 
"'monopoly" came to be associated with any acts which produced the harmful 
results of Crown grants of monopolies. There thus grew up "fear as to the evil 
consequences which might arise from the acts of individuals producing or 
tending to produce the consequences of monopoly."88 By focusing on conse- 
quences rather than form, White introduced into the common law an engine 
of change and growth: ". . . [A]s modern conditions arose the trend of legis- 
lation and judicial decision came more and more to adopt the recognized re- 
strictions to new manifestations of conduct or of dealing which it was thought 
justified the inference of intent to do the wrongs which it had been the pur- 
pose to prevent from the beginning."89 The guiding principle was thus the 
prohibition of "all contracts or acts which were unreasonably restrictive of 
85. 221 U.S. 1, 50-51. 
86. Id. at 51. 
87. Id. at 52. The common law was concerned with monopoly only when it resulted 
from a grant by the Crown. The courts' objection to it seems to have been primarily an 
aspect of the struggle between Crown and Parliament. Nevertheless, pro-consumer argu- 
ments were made in the course of disputes over Crown-granted monopolies and these gave 
some support to White's remarks. See Darcy v. Allen, F. Moore 673, 11 Coke 84. 
88. 221 U.S. at 57. 
89. Id. at 57-58. 
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competitive conditions, either from the nature or character of the contract 
or act or where the surrounding circumstances were such as to justify the 
conclusion" that they had not the "legitimate purpose of reasonably forwarding 
personal interest and developing trade" but rather had been intended "to bring 
about the evils, such as enhancement of prices, which were considered to be 
against public policy."90 
White's next task was to equate this highly colored version of the common 
law's "elementary and indisputable conceptions" with the Sherman Act. He 
bridged the gap by employing a distinction he had already made between re- 
straints of trade in the "subjective sense" and those in the "broad" or "generic 
sense." The former were voluntary restraints a person put upon his freedom 
to pursue his calling. Restraints in the "broad sense," according to White, 
were those "contracts or acts which it was considered had a monopolistic 
tendency, especially those which were thought to unduly diminish compe- 
tition and hence to enhance prices - in other words to monopolize ."91 
White contended that 
the context manifests that the statute was drawn in the light of the 
existing practical conception of the law of restraint of trade [as con- 
trasted with the actual body of precedent], because it groups as within 
that class, not only contracts which were in restraint of trade in the 
subjective sense, but all contracts or acts which theoretically were attempts 
to monopolize, yet which in practice had come to be considered as in re- 
straint of trade in a broad sense.92 
The Act's reference to restraints in the broad or generic sense lay, presumably, 
in section l's prohibition in addition to "contracts" of "Every . . . combination 
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or com- 
merce ... ."93 The Sherman Act thus incorporated the economic standards - 
the prevention or elimination of the power to fix prices, of the power to restrict 
output, and of the danger of deterioration in product quality - which White 
claimed were the elementary conceptions of the common law. Since the statute 
prohibited "classes of acts" which were "broad enough to embrace every 
conceivable contract or combination which could be made concerning trade 
or commerce" the courts must exercise judgment according to a "standard 
of reason" - it became the "rule of reason" a few paragraphs later - to de- 
termine whether the statute was violated.94 
Far from encompassing the destruction of the Sherman Act or giving to 
courts the unlimited power to say which trusts or cartels were "good" and 
which "bad," as so many critics immediately claimed,95 White had phrased 
90. Id. at 58. 
91. Id. at 57. 
92. Id. at 59. 
93. Id. at 49. 
94. Id. at 60. 
95. See note 83 supra. The passage of the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Com- 
mission Act in 1914 owed much to the common misunderstanding of White's interpretation 
of the statute. See HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 6-20 (1924); and 
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a rule of reason keyed to the avoidance of the consequences of monopoly and 
had placed upon the courts the duty of performing economic analysis to de- 
termine in which acts and agreements the evils of monopoly were present. 
In the area of loose arrangements he clearly contemplated a test much like 
Peckham's, or Taft's, and provided for a category of agreements illegal per se. 
Thus, restating the rule of reason in American Tobacco, White said "the words 
'restraint of trade' . . . only embraced acts or contracts or agreements or com- 
binations . . . which, either because of their inherent nature or effect or be- 
cause of the evident purpose of the acts, etc., injuriously restrained trade...."96 
If this is read as a three-part test,97 White's rule of reason held an agreement 
unlawful if its inherent nature, or its effect, or its purpose was to produce the 
evils of monopoly. Since White now apparently accepted Trans-Missouri and 
Joint Traffic as correctly decided against defendants without trial,98 the "in- 
herent nature" test was probably a per se rule holding cartel agreements, or, 
if you like, non-ancillary restraints, unlawful without more. If the agreement 
was not on its face one within this per se category, the rule of reason required 
examination of the purpose of the parties or the effects actually produced to 
determine whether the evils of monopoly were intended or achieved. If the 
word "inherent" in White's sentence modifies "effect," as seems likely, it 
may be that the test contemplated not an examination of actual effects but an 
inference of the effect from some other fact, probably from the market size 
or power of the party or parties. If so, the test may state that an agreement or 
behavior is illegal if either its inherent nature (the per se concept), its inherent 
effect (shown by market power), or its purpose is to achieve the evils speci- 
fied by White as attributable to monopoly. 
Also built into White's doctrine was concern for the efficiencies that might 
be created by contract or combination. He was careful to point out that "the 
statute did not forbid or restrain the power to make normal and usual con- 
tracts to further trade by resorting to all normal methods, whether by agree- 
ment or otherwise ..."99 Certainly White indicated that the mere elimination 
of competition by agreement was not enough to confer illegality, and he ap- 
pears to have been concerned not to destroy combinations that created efficiency. 
This was true even in his application of the law to the Standard Oil and 
American Tobacco trusts. There he seemed to say that not even mergers and 
stock transfers creating firms of such enormous market size were necessarily 
CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 178-87 (1941). 
Ironically, 
White's concern that the antitrust law be suitably flexible led, through 
a misreading of the 
tests he suggested, to the enactment of statutes which have had 
the result of introducing 
harsh and rigid rules against a variety of business practices which 
he apparently regarded 
as normal methods of trade. 
96. 221 U.S. 106, 179. 
97. The language can also be read as a two-part test by understanding inherent 
nature 
and effect to mean the same thing. 
98. 221 U.S. 1, 64-68. 
99. 221 U.S. 106, 179. 
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illegal. Rather, he treated even the deliberate gathering of control over the 
petroleum industry in the hands of Standard of New Jersey as creating, "in 
the absence of countervailing circumstances," a "prima facie presumption" 
of intent to maintain dominance over the industry, not only by "normal methods 
of industrial development, but by new means of combination which were re- 
sorted to in order that greater power might be added than would otherwise 
have arisen had normal methods been followed, the whole with the purpose 
of excluding others from the trade . . ."100 This "prima facie presumption" 
was made conclusive by observing that such methods had actually been used to 
exclude others from the industry.101 The opinion is thus preoccupied with 
abuses, predatory practices, or unnatural methods of gaining and maintaining 
market position. The function of abuses, apparently, is to reassure the Court 
that the attainment and maintenance of size was not due to efficiency.102 It is 
impossible from this to do mare than conclude that concern for efficiency 
played a leading role in White's rule of reason, for the case did not present 
the opportunity to demonstrate the role of that concern where loose arrange- 
ments not accompanied by predatory practices were involved. 
White himself pointed out the similarity or even identity of his rule to 
Peckham's.108 Though this is often taken as an example of the common judi- 
cial tactic of insisting that the law is unchanged while changing it, it seems 
likely here that White was both sincere and accurate. No case up to that 
time, not even the Northern Securities decision,- had held that all eliminations 
of competition were per se unlawful. White's acceptance of Trans-Missouri 
and Joint Traffic and his own three-part test result in a rule of reason largely, 
if not completely, convertible either to Peckham's test of direct and indirect 
restraints or Taft's test of ancillary and non-ancillary restraints. It should be 
stressed that White's test was phrased wholly in economic terms, giving no 
evidence of concern for possibly competing values. A corollary of this value 
choice is that the law should develop according to the progress of economic 
thought. The law is, therefore, neither made inflexible by controlling prece- 
dent nor required to change only through abrupt shifts of basic doctrine. Thus 
a court could alter the law without repudiating the theory underlying prior 
decisions by explaining that those decisions had misconceived the economic 
effect of particular agreements or practices. This characteristic is, of course, 
inherent in Peckham's and Taft's statements of the rule of reason, as it is in 
any law governed by economic analysis. Only White, however, made the 
mechanism of change explicit by incorporating his version of the common 
law - with its principle of focusing always upon the consequences of monopoly 
for consumers - into the Sherman Act. 
100. 221 U.S. 1, 75. 
101. Id. at 75-77. 
102. See also the treatment of this theme in American Tobacco, 221 U.S. 106, 181-83. 
103. 221 U.S. 1, 66. 
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Justice Harlan's Obscurities 
Justice Harlan is often taken to have been an enemy of the rule of reason 
and to have insisted on an absolute rule of per se illegality for all agreements 
or integrations that eliminated competition. This view rests primarily upon his 
opinion for the Court in the 1904 Northern Securities decision 104 and his in- 
dignant dissents to the later Standard Oil and American Tobacco opinions. 
Yet it seems clear, or as clear as such questions usually admit of being, that 
this is a misreading of Harlan. Just as Harlan's dissents in Standard Oil and 
American Tobacco misled many persons into thinking that White had there 
adopted his old reasonable-price criterion, so Holmes' dissent in Northern 
Securities has misled many to believe that Harlan had there adopted a rigid 
per se stance. The confusion in Northern Securities may have arisen because 
Harlan and Holmes perceived the economic phenomenon before the Court dif- 
ferently and were talking past each other. Holmes, failing to realize that Har- 
lan was enunciating the law applicable to a wholly different sort of economic 
arrangement, proceeded to show that Harlan's law made no sense applied to 
Holmes' view of the facts. 
The case concerned the elimination of competition between the Great North- 
ern Railway Company and the Northern Pacific Railway Company which 
operated, according to Harlan's opinion, "parallel and competing lines across 
the continent through the northern tier of states between the Great Lakes and 
the Pacific... ."105 James J. Hill, and associate stockholders of Great North- 
ern, and J. Pierpont Morgan, and associate stockholders of the Northern 
Pacific, formed the Northern Securities Company, with a capital stock ot 
$400,000,000, which then exchanged its stock for capital stock of the two rail- 
road companies and thus acquired control of both. 
Harlan wrote for four Justices holding the fusion of ownership of the two 
competing railroads through a holding company violative of sections 1 and 2 
of the Sherman Act; Holmes wrote for four dissenters; and Brewer's con- 
currence in a separate opinion made a majority for Harlan's outcome. Harlan's 
opinion never rose much above heavy insistence upon such propositions as 
"every combination or conspiracy which would extinguish competition between 
otherwise competing railroads engaged in interstate trade or commerce, and 
which would in that way restrain such trade or commerce, is made illegal by 
the act."106 
Holmes' dissent pointed out that a fusion or consolidation was involved 
and that a law which forbade all elimination of competition by such means 
would not merely destroy such normal business entities as partnerships but 
would require the atomization of society. 
104. Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904). 
105. Id. at 320. 
106. Id. at 331. Italics in the original. 
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Never notably adept at doctrinal disputation,107 Harlan did not clearly 
articulate an answer to Holmes' charge. He seems, however, to have analyzed 
the case as not involving a consolidation or fusion, such as a partnership or a 
merger, but as presenting, essentially, only a cartel. Under that view the case 
required no more than the broad slogans he extracted from such prior de- 
cisions as Trans-Missouri and Joint Traffic. This would explain also Harlan's 
failure to discuss issues such as market dominance or predatory practices that 
might have been relevant to a merger case. Credibility is lent to this reading 
by several other aspects of Harlan's opinion. The "combination" he referred 
to as illegal was not the holding company itself but the antecedent agreement 
and cooperation of the stockholders of the two roads. He viewed this com- 
bination, led by Hill and Morgan, as organizing and using the holding com- 
pany merely as a device to attain improper ends.108 Moreover, Harlan stressed 
the use of the holding company device, italicizing the word "holding" repeat- 
edly, apparently to emphasize that there is something peculiar about a com- 
pany that merely holds. And apparently what was peculiar in Harlan's eyes 
was that there was no real fusion. He stressed the lack of real fusion when he 
107. Harlan's ineptitude in dogmatic analysis in Northern Securities and in the Stand- 
ard Oil and American Tobacco cases gives added point to a remark Holmes made about 
him in another connection: 
. . . [T]hat sage, although a man of real power, did not shine either in analysis or 
generalization and I never troubled myself much when he shied. I used to say that 
he had a powerful vise the jaws of which couldn't be got nearer than two inches to 
each other. 
2 HOLMES-POLLOCK Letters, 7-8 (Howe ed. 1941). 
108. . . . [U]nder the leadership of the defendants Hill and Morgan the stockholders 
of the Great Northern and Northern Pacific Railway corporations . . . combined 
and conceived the scheme of organizing a corporation . . . which should hold the 
shares of the stock of the constituent companies ... 
193 U.S. 197, 326 (Italics in original). He refers to the holding company as carrying out 
the purpose of the "original combination." Id. at 326-27. And 
[Wihat the Government particularly complains of, indeed, all that it complains of 
here, is the existence of a combination among the stockholders of competing railroad 
companies which in violation of the act of Congress restrains interstate and inter- 
national commerce through the agency of a common corporate trustee designated to 
act for both companies in represssing free competition between them. 
Id. at 335. This may illuminate Harlan's pronouncement elsewhere that 
The mere existence of such a combination and the power acquired by the holding 
company as its trustee, constitute a menace to, and a restraint upon, that freedom 
of commerce which Congress intended to recognize and protect, and which the pub- 
lic is entitled to have protected. 
Id. at 327. This may be and sometimes is read as a statement that a merger involving 
market power is illegal without more under section 1 of the Sherman Act, or, if the 
"power" of the holding company be taken simply as the ability to eliminate competition 
between formerly competing units, as a statement that a merger Ieliminating any com- 
petition is illegal without regard either to intent or market power. It seems more plausi- 
ble, in view of Harlan's usage elsewhere in the opinion, to read "combination" here as 
referring not to Northern Securities itself but to the prior cooperation between Hill and 
Morgan and their associated stockholders and thus to interpret the remark as a statement 
of the per se illegality not of mergers but of cartels. 
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said that the holding company was "to manage, or cause to be managed, both 
lines of railroad as if held in one ownership."'' Harlan also emphasized'-Mor- 
gan's testimony to refute the theory that a mere investment-by Northern 
Securities was involved, and this further demonstrated his view of the trans- 
action. Asked why the stocks of both railroads were placed -in one holding 
company Morgan had answered that the "holding company was simply a ques- 
tion of custodian because it had no other alliances." Of this Harlan said, "That 
disclosed the actual nature of the transaction, which was only to organize the 
Northern Securities Company as a holding company, in whose hands, not as 
a real purchaser or absolute owner, but simply as custodian were to be placed 
the stocks of the constituent companies -such custodian to represent the com- 
bination formed between the shareholders of the' constituent companies, the 
direct and necessary effect of such combination being, as already indicated, to 
restrain and monopolize interstate commerce by suppressing, or .(to use the 
words of this court in United States v. Joint Traffic Assn.) 'smothering' com- 
petition between the lines of two railway carriers."110 Everything about this 
109. Id. at 326. Italics added. Italics removed from last three words of -quotation. De- 
fendants' briefs also stressed the lack of any real fusion of the railroad companies, point- 
ing out that they retained separate managements and boards of directors. Though defend- 
ants intended thus to show that competition between the roads would continue, it may well 
have had the effect of convincing some of the justices that this was not a fusion of pro- 
ductive activities like that in a partnership or a merger but merely a profit pooling plan. 
The primary reason defendants gave for the formation of Northern Securities was the 
desire to put the controlling interest of the Northern Pacific out of reach of the owners 
of Union Pacific or other "raiders". Since the active parties also- held Great Northern 
stock, it was decided, according to defendants, to have Northern Securities offer to pur- 
chase Great Northern stock as well. See, for example, Brief for Northern Securities Com- 
pany, filed by John G. Johnson, p. 10. J. P. Morgan testified, however, that the purpose 
of putting the stock of both railroad companies in one holding company was simply to form 
a company "with capital large enough that nobody ever could buy it." Quoted from record 
in Brief for the United States, p. 37. 
110. 193 U.S. at 354. Harlan's use of this quotation from Morgan's testimony seems 
questionable since the line Harlan quoted was followed very shortly by the further ex- 
planation that the purpose of making the Northern Securities Company a "custodian" was 
to form a holding company whose capital was so large as to make it impervious to raids. 
This testimony may not have been believable, but it hardly seems to support Harlan's at- 
tempt to convict Morgan of a purpose to suppress competition out of his own mouth. Mor- 
gan's testimony could have been used to show that the joint ownership of the two roads 
eliminated competition without any of the compensating efficiencies that make mergers, 
unlike cartels, susceptible of justification. 
The fact that neither side argued the question of efficiencies and that neither side at- 
tempted a distinction between cartels, on the one hand, and mergers and partnerships, on 
the other, indicates that the law was still groping for its basic distinctions. In his oral argu- 
ment, counsel for defendants put the questions which seemed so troublesome to Holmes. 
See text accompanying notes 123, 124 infra. Oral Argument of George B. Young, for the 
Appellants, in reply to the Attorney-General, Dec. 15, 1903, pp. 6-7. These come down to 
the question of whether the government's argument that the suppression of competition by 
contract or combination was per se illegal would not preclude every merger of competitors, 
every partnership between competitors, and every purchase by one competitor of another's 
business. The government seems to have answered Mr. Young by distinguishing this case 
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passage - the stress on the fact that the holding company was to be a cus- 
todian and not a real purchaser or owner, the identification of the combination 
as being between the shareholders and not between the railroads, the refer- 
ences to Joint Traffic - indicates that Harlan considered he was dealing with 
a cartel and not a merger. 
This interpretation of the opinion is not only more consistent with the text 
than the usual reading given it, but makes sense of a position which otherwise 
seems exposed as inane by Holmes' dissent."'1 It seems clear, then, that Har- 
lan in this case was well within the proper limits of the per se rules established 
by Peckham and Taft. He saw the holding company as no more than a profit- 
pooling device and therefore the exact equivalent of a price-fixing agreement. 
The fact that Peckham concurred in Holmes' dissent probably indicates not 
that Harlan had changed the law nor that Peckham had reneged on the ration- 
ale of his earlier opinions but only that the latter agreed with Holmes that a 
fusion or merger was involved.112 
from the ordinary partnership or merger on the grounds of intent. Here suppression of 
competition was the purpose, while in the other cases it would be "only ancillary and col- 
lateral to the main object." Brief for the United States, p. 72. But it may also have been 
relevant from the government's point-of view that the fusion created power to raise prices 
or suppress competition. Id. at 76-78. The power seems more to have been assumed than 
argued, except that the government framed many of its legal propositions specifially in 
terms of railroads and the fact that defendants were railroads may have been thought to 
create power. See, for example, Oral Argument of the Attorney-General of the United 
States, pp. 28-29. This may suggest that power was thought an essential element in the 
illegality of cartels and also, as Brewer's concurrence suggested, that railroads occupied 
a special category. See note 112 infra. 
111. It also demonstrates that Northern Securities should not be viewed as a merger 
precedent, though commonly used as such. Justice Douglas, for example, recently employed 
the case as a crucial precedent in a merger case, United States v. First Nat'l Bank & 
Trust Co. of Lexington, 376 U.S. 665, 670 (1964). 
112. Justice Brewer, concurring, seemed to agree that-Northern Securities was essen- 
tially a cartel case, 193 U.S. at 362, but he thought a test of reasonableness had to be 
introduced to save "those minor contracts in partial restraint of trade" which the common 
law upheld and to allow for the "inalienable rights" of individual citizens to invest in the 
stock of corporations although that might result in the destruction of competition. Id. at 
361. The first of these objections to the law announced in prior cases seems to involve a 
misunderstanding of their rationale, but the second, if taken seriously, would have required 
a modification of the rule as phrased by Peckham. Brewer did not fully articulate his 
standard of reasonableness, but, it seems, with the exception noted, not to have differed 
greatly from Peckham's, utilizing a test of whether the purpose and effect of a transaction 
was the general suppression of competition. Perhaps his test required market power, for 
he stated: 
It must also be remembered that under present conditions a single railroad is, 
if not a legal, largely a practical, monopoly, and the arrangement by which the 
control of these two competing roads was merged in a single corporation broadens 
and extends such monopoly. I cannot look upon it as other than an unreasonable 
combination in restraint of interstate commerce . . .. 
Id. at 363. This analysis, though seemingly made in connection with a cartel case, was 
later applied in railroad merger cases, apparently to supply the requisite market power, and 
thus formed the basis for the observation that the Sherman Act treated railroad mergers 
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Harlan's dissents in Standard Oil and American Tobacco 113 protested 
against what he erroneously believed to be a return to an undefined standard 
of reasonableness rejected by the Court in Trans-Missouri and Joint Traffic. 
Thus, Harlan, though confused concerning the Court's doctrine, actually was 
in substantial agreement with it. 
Justice Hughes and Vertical Price Fixing 
The early cases made no distinction between horizontal and vertical price 
fixing. In 1911, shortly before the Standard Oil and American Tobacco cases, 
the Supreme Court in the Dr. Miles case,"14 reviewing the dismissal of a com- 
plaint on demurrer, held illegal a resale price maintenance program maintained 
by a manufacturer of proprietary medicines through an enormous network of 
contracts with wholesalers and retailers. To the manufacturer's assertion that 
a standard retail price was important to it and that confusion and damage had 
resulted from sales at less than the prices fixed, Justice Hughes for the Court 
replied that the advantages of the scheme went to the dealers rather than the 
manufacturer. But then Hughes faced the claim directly and rejected it: 
If there be an advantage to the manufacturer in the maintenance of fixed 
retail prices, the question remains whether it is one which he is entitled 
to secure by agreements restricting the freedom of trade on the part of 
dealers who own what they sell. As to this, complainant can fare no better 
with its plan of identical contracts than could the dealers themselves if 
they formed a combination and endeavored to establish the same restric- 
tions, and thus to achieve the same result, by agreement with each other. 
If the immediate advantage they would thus obtain would not be sufficient 
to sustain a direct agreement, the asserted ulterior benefit to the com- 
plainant cannot be regarded as sufficient to support its system.115 
Aside from its equation of horizontal and vertical price fixing, this passage 
is interesting because it failed to ask whether the manufacturer's interest in 
eliminating price competition between its distributors could be related to a 
more severely than other mergers. See Levi, The Antitrust Laws and Monopoly, 14 U. 
CHi. L. REV. 153, 157 (1947). 
Rather surprisingly, this old "railroad category" of Sherman Act merger cases has re- 
cently been resurrected and applied by a Supreme Court majority to a non-railroad merger. 
To say in the Lexington Bank case, si-pra note 111, as the Court did, that it is governed 
by Northern Securities is not merely to apply a cartel precedent in the merger area, but to 
suggest the application of railroad merger precedent, regardless of the uniqueness of that 
category, to all combinations. 
113. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 82-106 (1911); 
United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 189-93 (1911). 
114. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). 
115. Id. at 408-09. The proximity of this decision, which rests by analogy on the per 
se illegality of horizontal price fixing, to the Standard Oil and American Tobacco decisions 
is additional evidence that those cases did not overturn the rule of Trans-Missouri and 
Joint Traffic. Standard Oil and American Tobacco were both argued and reargued prior 
to the decision of Dr. Miles. They were handed down in April and Dr..Miles came down 
in May. It is far-fetched to imagine that the Court was abandoning the rule of strict 
illegality for cartel arrangements in the Standard Oil and American Tobacco cases at the 
same time that it was making that rule the pivotal point of its Dr. Miles rationale. 
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valid main purpose capable of legitimating the contracts. Taft had suggested 
in Addyston that a vertical arrangement might be validated on that ground. 
In Dr. Miles Hughes ignored or rejected that lead and it was not until over 
sixty years had passed that Douglas in White Motor very tentatively ad- 
vanced the same idea, though, rather inconsistently, being careful to limit even 
the possibility of legality to market divisions and stressing the continuing vi- 
tality of Dr. Miles' rule against resale price maintenance."6 
The Establishment of Deviant Themes in the Rule of Reason 
The principal architects of theoretical structures that differ significantly from 
the dominant Peckham-Taft-White version are Justices Holmes and Brandeis. 
Brandeis' philosophy of the Act is far and away the more important and in- 
fluential today. Holmes' reading of the statute, which was curiously mechanical 
and internally inconsistent, has had no appreciable impact upon the law's 
development. 
The Law According to Justice Holmes 
Holmes attempted his one general structuring of the Sherman Act in his 1904 
Northern Securities dissent. It seems fair to say that the structure he sug- 
gested was keyed to no particularly intelligible policy and that the oblivion into 
which it lapsed was well earned. It is also necessary to say, however, that 
Holmes put basic questions concerning the Act and its policy which remain 
provocative today. 
The crux of Holmes' position was that the statute must be interpreted in 
strict accordance with the common law whose terms it employed and without 
reference to any supposed policy of preserving competition. "The act," he in- 
sisted, "says nothing about competition.""17 If it did say anything about com- 
petition, he suggested, it was that a little bit went a long way. As shown by 
the statute's use of the words "in the form of trust or otherwise," which was 
suggested by the then popular trust device for putting together industries 
such as oil, the statute was aimed not at the elimination of competition by 
unions of competitors, Holmes said, but at "the sinister power exercised or 
supposed to be exercised by the combination in keeping rivals out of the busi- 
ness and ruining those who already were in. It was the ferocious extreme of 
competition with others, not the cessation of competition among the partners, 
that was the evil feared.""8 Claiming to stick to the actual text of the statute, 
Holmes argued: 
The words hit two classes of cases, and only two - contracts in restraint 
of trade and combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade.... Con- 
tracts in restraint of trade are dealt with and defined by the common law. 
They are contracts with a stranger to the contractor's business (although, 
in some cases, carrying on a similar one), which wholly or partially re- 
strict the freedom of the contractor in carrying on that business as other- 
116. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 260 (1963). 
117. Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. at 403. 
118. Id. at 405. 
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wise he would. . .. Of course, this objection did not apply to partner- 
ships or other forms, if there were any, of substituting a community of 
interest where there had been competition.... Combinations or conspir- 
acies in restraint of trade, on the other hand, were combinations to keep 
strangers to the agreement out of the business. The objection to them 
was not an objection to their effect upon the parties making the contract, 
the members of the combination or firm, but an objection to their intended 
effect upon strangers to the firm and their supposed consequent effect 
upon the public at large. In other words, they were regarded as contrary 
to public policy because they monopolized, or attempted to monopolize, 
some portion of the trade or commerce of the realm.'19 
This passage contains surprising inconsistencies. If he had succeeded in 
ridding the Act of competition as a standard, Holmes would also have de- 
stroyed the rule of reason Peckham had created. Holmes' reading, then, would 
have outlawed all the so-called ancillary or collateral restraints known to the 
common law which did not involve the creation of a community of interest. 
Perhaps this result could have been avoided by saying that a contract not to 
compete with the purchaser of one's business was not a contract with a 
stranger to the business and hence not one in restraint of trade. That would 
have made Holmes' interpretation workable but it would also have destroyed 
the sole merit he claimed for it - fidelity to the common law meaning of 
the words used. 
A more fundamental objection is that Holmes' reading came dangerously 
close to leaving the law bereft of reason for existence. If competition was not 
the guiding policy, it would be difficult to understand the Trans-Missouri 
and Joint Traffic decisions which Holmes said he accepted "absolutely, not 
only as binding upon me, but as decisions which I have no desire to criticize 
or abridge."'20 The policy behind those decisions can hardly have been, as a 
common law rationale would suggest, to protect the railroads from improvi- 
dent bargains. The cases either rested on a policy of preserving competition 
or must be taken as wholly incoherent. 
Holmes' inability to keep competition out of an Act which, he insisted, said 
nothing about it was underscored by his statement that the aggressions of com- 
binations were feared because of their "intended effect upon strangers" and 
"their supposed consequent effect upon the public at large." The adverse effect 
upon the public can hardly have been anything other than the ultimate loss of 
competition. 
Holmes' construction of the Sherman Act was thus not merely at odds with 
the common law, which he claimed was controlling, but, on its own premises, 
was internally inconsistent and geared to no discernible rational policy con- 
sideration. The only way in which Holmes' reading of the Act can be made 
sensible, and, indeed, begin to shed light on the fundamental problems of this 
area of the law, is to put back into it the economic ideas associated with the 
policy of competition which Holmes claimed to exclude. Thus, in terms of 
119. Id. at 404. 
120. Id. at 405. 
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results rather than supporting generalizations, it is possible to read Holmes 
as follows: The Sherman Act condemns all cartel agreements between persons 
whose businesses remain otherwise independent; it condemns all excessive 
competition by combinations or individuals whose purpose is the exclusion of 
others from the industry; it permits the elimination of all competition by the 
"substituting [of] a community of interest where there had been competition." 
The concern for the elimination of competition in the first two branches of this 
restatement may seem to contrast oddly with the seeming indifference to it in 
the last. Holmes' surface answer - that that's the way the common law is and 
we are only concerned with the reading of words defined by the common law 
- is clearly nonsensical, but behind it may have lain his concern that if 
Northern Securities Company, which he saw as a fusion or merger, were 
struck down as a combination in restraint of trade, logical consistency would 
"require all existing competitions to be kept on foot, and, on the principle of 
the Trans-Missouri Freight Association's case, invalidate the continuance of 
old contracts by which former competitors united in the past."'121 The weak- 
ness of the structure Holmes would have imposed on the statute is that it 
would have allowed unlimited elimination of competition by merger. Cartelists 
could easily have evaded the rule of Trans-Missouri by utilizing purely formal 
fusions of their firms since Holmes had argued that not even a proved intent 
to suppress competition would defeat a holding company's legality. Never- 
theless, he had hold of a crucial economic distinction - that between cartels 
and mergers - when he said that "To suppress competition in that way [by 
a contract with a stranger to one's business] is one thing; to suppress it by 
fusion is another."M 
He picked up this theme again: "To see whether I am wrong, the illustra- 
tions put in the argument are of use. If I am, then a partnership between 
two stage drivers who had been competitors in driving across a state line, or 
two merchants once engaged in rival commerce among the States whether 
made after or before the act, if now continued, is a crime. For, again I repeat, 
if the restraint on the freedom of the members of a combination caused by their 
entering into a partnership is a restraint of trade, every such combination, as 
well the small as the great, is within the act."'123 He said that this interpreta- 
tion "would make eternal the bellum omniumn contra ones and disintegrate 
society so far as it could into individual atoms."'124 
Holmes was right of course in recognizing that any absolute per se rule 
against the elimination of competition was impossible, inconsistent even with 
the most primitive forms of society. The difficulty he saw could have been 
solved by giving heed to the full implications of Peckham's definition of "re- 
straint of trade" as the suppression of competition in the general market. Car- 
tels, which make no sense unless effective to smother competition generally, 
121. Id. at 410. 
122. Ibid. 
123. Id. at 410-11. 
124. Id. at 411. 
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are thus rendered automatically illegal, while mergers, which very often do 
make sense to the parties without any adverse general effect upon competition, 
would be outlawed only if the parties had such large market shares that gen- 
eral competition was stifled. This distinction would have enabled Holmes to 
hold the combination in Northern Securities illegal without adopting a rule 
requiring the atomization of society. But Holmes thought the statute unable 
to distinguish between combinations of different size because he thought of 
size in the absolute sense.'25 The use of a test keyed to competition and its 
preservation would have enabled him to distinguish between combinations of 
different sizes relative to their markets.126 First and last, Holmes' construc- 
tion of the statute was stultified by his efforts to keep competition out of it. 
Holmes also queried the application of the statute to mergers on one addi- 
tional ground: Since a single corporation could lawfully have constructed the 
lines of both railroads, how could it be unlawful for a single corporation to 
purchase them both after they were built ?127 This should be compared with 
the question Taft had raised: If a railroad corporation could lawfully furnish 
sleeping-car service itself, and thus exclude all competitive furnishers of that 
service, how could it be unlawful for it to hire another to provide the service 
and exclude would-be competitors by contract ?128 These are basic questions 
with which the rule of reason is still struggling.'29 
Holmes' contribution to the rule of reason, then, was quite limited. To his 
credit, he effectively destroyed the notion that any absolute per se rule against 
all arrangements that eliminate competition is even a theoretical possibility. 
His attempted positive contributions, however, were largely invalidated be- 
cause he approached antitrust not only without an adequate understanding of 
basic economic concepts,'30 but with a denial even of the relevance of com- 
petition. The fact that he proved unable to keep the concept of competition, 
and hence economic reasoning, out of his analyses made them somewhat in- 
consistent but also gave them whatever value and provocativeness they pos- 
sessed. 
125. Id. at 407-08. 
126. This, of course, is what Peckham's formula as to restraint of trade allowed. 
Peckham's agreement with Holmes may have been due to the fact that he saw the case 
as involving a merger and thought that market size had not sufficiently been shown, or 
perhaps he was not ready to apply his formula to mergers at all. 
127. Id. at 407. 
128. See text following note 72 supra. 
129. See, for example, Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in White Motors v. United 
States, 372 U.S. 253, 264 (1963), discussed in Section II of this article. 
130. Thus, in his Dr. Miles dissent, speaking not just of resale price maintenance but, 
apparently, of problems of competition and monopoly generally, Holmes said: "I think 
that we greatly exaggerate the value and importance to the public of competition in the 
production or distribution of an article (here it is only distribution) as fixing a fair price." 
220 U.S. 373, 412 (1911). He thought that interproduct or inter-industry rivalry fixed the 
fair price. Ibid. Holmes thus demonstrated that he did not understand the role of com- 
petition, including competition between producers and between distributors of the same 
product, in allocating resources so as to maximize consumer satisfaction. 
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The Law According to Justice Brandeis 
Brandeis' rule of reason, though also well outside the main tradition of the 
law has, unlike Holmes', not proven barren. The difference springs from two 
factors. A strong underlying policy orientation of Brandeis' rule seems to have 
been sympathy for small, perhaps inefficient, traders who might go under in 
fully competitive markets. His rule thus spoke for the tempering of competi- 
tion by private agreement. This, of course, is an enduring strand in antitrust 
policy, reflecting there a strong anticompetitive element of our national social 
policy. But the staying power of Brandeis' rule probably owes as much to its 
very lack of that conceptual clarity which characterized Holmes' rule. Its less 
respectable, because unadmitted, anticompetitive aspects were thus often diffi- 
cult to isolate and identify. This very element of blurriness, moreover, made 
Brandeis' version of the law convenient for judges working within the main 
tradition whose own doctrine lacked sufficient distinctions to validate the oc- 
casional agreement not to compete which seemed legitimate for reasons they 
found difficult to articulate. Brandeis' phrasing of doctrine thus sometimes 
served to give the Peckham-Taft-White rule of reason the flexibility which 
it required but lacked the economic framework to achieve. 
Brandeis' opinion for the Court in the 1918 Chicago Board of Trade case 131 
is at once illustrative of his ideas and an important, though ambiguous, anti- 
trust precedent. The case arose on the government's suit to enjoin the Board 
of Trade's enforcement of a rule fixing the prices at which its members could 
make certain sales and purchases. The Board provided an exchange for grain 
trading for its approximately 1600 members, who included brokers, commis- 
sion merchants, dealers, millers, maltsters, makers of corn products, and ele- 
vator owners. Transactions at Board sessions, on bids and sales publicly made, 
were between members only, but members traded on behalf of others as well 
as themselves and were also permitted to trade privately with each other and 
with non-members, though not on premises occupied by the Board. The regu- 
lation attacked by the government was the price-fixing portion of the Board's 
"call" rule. The "call" was a special session of the Board held immediately 
after the close of each day's regular session. The regular session was taken up 
with spot sales and future sales (respectively, sales of grain already in Chicago 
in railroad cars or elevators for immediate delivery, and agreements for de- 
livery later in the current or in some future month). The "call" was occupied 
with -sales "to arrive" (agreements to deliver on arrival grain which was al- 
ready in transit to Chicago or was to be shipped there within a specified time). 
Purchases of grain "to arrive" were made not only at the "call" from members 
who offered it on behalf of others but also were made directly from country 
dealers and farmers, sometimes by telephone or telegraphed bids, but most 
often by sending out offers to purchase to hundreds of country dealers by the 
afternoon mail, subject to acceptance before 9 :30 a.m. on the next business 
day. 
131. Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). 
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The "call" rule promulgated by the Board both established the "call" in 
order to provide a public competitive market to replace the private market 
that had grown up, and also prohibited members of the Board from purchasing 
or offering.to purchase during the period between the close of the call, usually 
at about 2 p.m., and the opening of the regular session at 9:30 a.m. on the next 
business day, any wheat, corn, oats, or rye "to arrive" at a price other than 
the. closing bid on the call. The result, of course, was to confine price com- 
petition to a portion of the day and to fix prices over the greater part of the 
day. 
The significance of the rule, on those facts, is certainly equivocal. It is hard 
to see what legitimate purpose the Board had in allowing its members to trade 
overnight but fixing the prices at which they could do so, but certainly it is 
equally difficult to perceive an illegitimate intent to rig the market in such an 
apparently inconsequential restraint. Unfortunately, the government had, and 
persuaded the district court to adopt, an intellectually trivial theory of the 
case. Offering no evidence to show the purpose or effect of the price-fixing 
provision, the government rested upon the proposition-which it later offered 
to the Supreme Court as dispositive of the case: "An agreement between men 
occupying a position of such strength and. influence in any branch of trade to 
fix the prices at which they shall buy or sell during an important part of the 
business day is an agreement in restraint of trade within the narrowest defini- 
tion of the term."'32 The district, court struck from defendants' answer allega- 
tions and excluded much evidence concerning .the purposes underlying the 
rule. When defense witnesses testified in general terms to the benefits flowing 
from the rule, government counsel .did not press. the cross-examination to 
determine how the rule and the benefits were. causally related. In fact, how- 
ever, as the government's brief in the Supreme Court pointed out,138 most of 
the benefits claimed for the rule - claims which Brandeis accepted at face 
value - were not related to the price-fixing provision at all, but to the rule's 
establishment of the "call" as a public.market.'34 
Brandeis, writing an opinion upholding the agreement, began his argument 
by rejecting "the bold proposition, that a rule. or agreement by which men 
occupying positions of strength in any branch o.f trade, fixed prices. at which 
they would buy or sell during an important. part. of the business day, is an 
illegal restraint of trade under the Anti-Trust Law..' 5 He. went on, in a 
passage which has become famous, to hold that it. had been an error for the 
trial court to strike the allegations and exclude evidence concerning the history 
and purposes of the "call" rule: 
132. Brief for the United States, p. 9. 
133. Brief for the United States, pp. 14-16. 
134. If there was confusion, it probably arose from the fact that witnesses were per- 
mitted to testify to the benefits of the "call" rule without specifying whether they were 
praising the establishment of a public market or the fixing of prices overnight. This testi- 
mony got into the record despite the trial court's rulings, but, perhaps because of those 
rulings, the government did not trouble to cross-examine rigorously. 
135. 246 U.S. 231, 238. 
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. . . [T]he legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined 
by so simple a test, as whether it restrains competition. Every agreement 
concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, 
is of their very essence. The true test of legality is whether the restraint 
imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes com- 
petition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. 
To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts 
peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition 
before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and 
its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed 
to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end 
sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a good 
intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; 
but because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts 
and to predict consequences.136 
This dictum is often quoted as the quintessential expression of the rule of 
reason, and apparently it struck the rest of the Court at the time as sufficiently 
orthodox. Thus, the catalogue of relevant inquiries may be taken as no more 
than examples of investigations into purpose and effect of the sort White ad- 
vocated in- the Standard Oil and American Tobacco cases. Such studies would 
certainly have made sense here since the "call" rule was neither obviously a 
cartel agreement nor clearly not one. 
Yet there seems to be more to Brandeis' intention -than that; there is a cast 
to the passage that is not entirely conventional. Brandeis phrases the test as 
whether restraint "merely regulates" or "may suppress." Unless the agreement 
be regarded as collateral and subordinate to another main, lawful transaction 
and Brandeis did not suggest one - that distinction -has a decidedly odd 
ring. It sounds as though regulation of competition - which seems difficult 
to differentiate from mitigation of competition- might be lawful as an end in 
itself. This impression is strengthened by Brandeis' reference to the "evil" 
which the restraint was designed to remedy. This is not the way one would 
speak of an ancillary restraint designed to implement another transaction. It 
has, rather, the flavor of language employed to justify- the dampening of com- 
petition in order to produce "healthier" conditions. Though he was stating a 
general theory of the Sherman Act, moreover, nowhere in the quoted passage 
or elsewhere in the opinion does Brandeis mention or suggest the existence 
of any category of restraints illegal per se. 
The conviction that Brandeis was advocating a deviant rule of -reason, what 
Taft would have called a "sea of doubt," is reinforced by the remainder of the 
Board of Trade opinion. Brandeis held not only that the trial judge had erred 
in excluding evidence, which would have required a remand for a-new trial, 
but went on to state that, even so, enough had been admitted affirmatively to 
demonstrate the regulation's legality. He asserted, without anything resem- 
bling adequate record support, that "the rule had no appreciable effect upon 
general market prices; nor did it materially affect the total volume of grain 
136. I-bid. 
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coming to Chicago."137 Brandeis went on to insist that the result of the price- 
fixing had actually been to improve market conditions.138 Although he cited 
improvements that seem to have been largely the results of the creation of a 
public market in the "call" session, and which had little relation either logical- 
ly or in the record to the price-fixing regulation, the examples offered must 
be taken to indicate, because so offered, the ends which Brandeis considered 
would justify an agreement on prices. They include such purposes as the 
bringing of transactions into the open so that all buyers and sellers could ob- 
tain knowledge of market conditions, the distribution of business among larger 
numbers of persons, and the elimination of business risks.139 Another indica- 
tion of proper motives for agreements lessening competition was given: 
137. Id. at 240. There was no basis for this conclusion in the record and could hardly 
have been any, given the impossibility of showing by evidence what the volume of grain 
shipments to Chicago would have been in the same time period without the rule. In any 
event, it would have been necessary to know whether sales had been shifted between sales 
"to arrive" and spot and future sales. Perhaps because of the trial court's view of the case, 
such questions had simply been passed over. 
138. Brandeis appears to have culled from the record, and accepted at face value, con- 
clusionary and often ambiguous statements made by defendants' witnesses. Those state- 
ments were never tested at the trial because of the position taken by the trial court, at the 
government's suggestion, that such evidence was immaterial and did not constitute a de- 
fense. Since he had held this view of the law to be erroneous, it seems remarkable that 
Brandeis should have accepted these untested assertions as conclusive support for his own 
views. 
139. ... [W]ithin the narrow limits of its operation the rule helped to improve mar- 
ket conditions thus: 
(a) It created a public market for grain "to arrive". Before its adoption bids 
were made privately. Men had to buy and sell without adequate knowledge of actual 
market conditions. This was disadvantageous to all concerned, but particularly so 
to country dealers and farmers. 
(b) It brought into the regular market hours of the Board sessions, more of the 
trading in grain "to arrive." 
(c) It brought buyers and sellers into more direct relations, because on the call 
they gathered together for a free and open interchange of bids and offers. 
(d) It distributed the business in grain "to arrive" among a far larger number 
of Chicago receivers and commission merchants than had been the case there before. 
(e) It increased the number of country dealers engaging in this branch of the 
business; supplied them more regularly with bids from Chicago; and also increased 
the number of bids received by them from competing markets. 
(f) It eliminated risks necessarily incident to a private market, and thus enabled 
country dealers to do business on a smaller margin. In that way the rule made it 
possible for them to pay more to farmers without raising the price to consumers. 
(g) It enabled country dealers to sell some grain to arrive which they would 
otherwise have been obliged either to ship to Chicago commission merchants or to 
sell for "future delivery." 
(h) It enabled those grain merchants of Chicago who sell to millers and exporters, 
to trade on a smaller margin and by paying more for grain or selling it for less, 
to make the Chicago market more attractive for both shippers and buyers of grain. 
(i) Incidentally it facilitated trading "to arrive" by enabling those engaged in 
these transactions to fulfill their contracts by tendering grain arriving at Chicago 
19651 THE RULE OF REASON 819 
Every Board of Trade and nearly every trade organization imposes some 
restraint upon the conduct of business by its members. Those relating to 
the hours in which business may be done are common; and they make a 
special appeal where, as here, they tend to shorten the working day or, 
at least, limit the period of most exacting activity.'40 
This statement, by its terms not limited to organized exchanges, indicates 
that the shortening of hours was considered a good in itself and might be suffi- 
cient to justify an agreement not to compete during part of the day. This sug- 
gests that Brandeis believed that private regulation of competition might 
legitimately have other than economic aims; it might go beyond regulating, 
and thereby promoting, competition, to the achievement of non-economic goals. 
To that extent, a Sherman Act court would be required to balance economic 
goals against more broadly social or humanitarian goals. 
The themes in Brandeis' Board of Trade opinion, then, are several and so 
skillfully woven together that they are difficult to disentangle. So far as' its 
holding is concerned, the case can be viewed in quite conventional terms. The 
agreement on price may be seen as a restraint ancillary to a joint venture: the 
formation and maintenance of a public market for sales "to arrive." Defend- 
ants argued the case along these lines, though not in that phraseology, when 
they said that the call rule was no different 'than the ordinary restriction of 
exchange trading to certain hours. The analogy may be imperfect but perhaps 
it carried the Court, particularly since the government offered no explanation 
of the rule as a cartel arrangement. Brandeis did not disown this reasoning 
and, since he insisted that the rule had no impact upon market price and 
volume of grain sold, it is impossible to know for certain what he would have 
said had the rule not related to an organized exchange (or, to use another 
formulation, not seemed ancillary to a joint venture) or if it had obviously 
affected market price. Yet it seems a fair inference from the foregoing analysis 
of his opinion that he was prepared, in any event, to accord independent weight 
to market "improvements" such as bringing transactions into the open (a 
theory that might have legitimated the agreements in Trans-Missouri and 
Joint Traffic) and to such goals as the spreading of business to more persons 
and the creation of leisure. 
That this is an accurate reading of Brandeis is further demonstrated by his 
strong belief in the worthiness, and hence the legality, of resale price mainte- 
on any railroad, whereas formerly shipments had to be made over the particular 
railroad designated by the buyer. 
246 U.S. at 240-41. 
Of these claimed improvements, (a) through (h), insofar as they may be taken seriously, 
appear wholly or in large part to be due to the establishment of the call as a public mar- 
ket rather than to the price-fixing requirement of the call rule. Many of the advantages, 
moreover, were obviously imaginary. There was, for example, no demonstration in the 
record of the "fact" recited in (h) that grain merchants were able to trade on a smaller 
margin and therefore paid more for the grain or sold it for less. (i) had nothing to do with 
the rule in question but was due to a change in contract form. 
140. Id. at 241. 
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nance. Prior to his appointment to the Supreme Court he protested vigorously 
against -its Dr. Miles decision: "President Wilson urged most wisely that, in- 
stead of sanctioning and regulating private monopoly, we should regulate com- 
petition. Undoubtedly statutes must be enacted to secure adequate and effec- 
tive regulation; but shall our courts prohibit voluntary regulation of com- 
petition by those engaged in business ?"141 
It has been suggested, it seems justly, that Brandeis' eagerness to uphold 
many private regulations of competition led him to resort to rather sophistical 
economic reasoning, of which Board of Trade provides an example, when that 
seemed necessary.142 This sometimes clouded his basic rationale. But in its 
invitation to judicial subjectivity, as well as in the economic nature of its re- 
sults,143 Brandeis' rule of reason bore an obvious kinship to the reasonable 
price standard advanced by White in 1897 and to the "sea of doubt" Taft 
warned against. 
The Persistence of Divergent Themes in the Rule of Reason 
After Chicago Board of Trade the major ground themes that sound in this 
area of antitrust had been laid down and there remained only their interplay 
and, perhaps optimistically, their eventual resolution. As of this moment, how- 
ever, most of the early confusion concerning both goals and ecenomic analysis 
remains a prominent feature of the law. 
It is true that Holmes' theory of the Sherman Act, as was probably to have 
been expected, has proved sterile and is forgotten. Brandeis' influence, how- 
ever, continues in a variety of ways. His belief that the law should display 
explicit concern for non-economic values, while it seems to play an increasingly 
important role in other areas of antitrust, has found only peripheral lodgment 
in the law of price fixing and market division under Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act. There may be indications, however, that that belief will play a larger role 
141. Brandeis, Competition that Kills, in BUSINESS - A PROFESSION 259 (1913). 
142. In interpreting this and other private agreements, Brandeis employed the same 
method he utilized in upholding the state legislation against constitutional attack 
under the due process clause. Apparently, he implied a presumption of reasonable- 
ness to such agreements and required the Government to negate [demonstrate?] any 
-anticompetitive purpose or effect by affirmative proof. As in the constitutional sphere, 
Brandeis buttressed the presumption by his ingenious ability to contrive a rational 
basis for the questioned arrangement. 
HANDLER, ANTITRUST IN PERSPECTIVE 94 n.130 (1957). This same tendency in Brandeis' 
judicial philosophy is indicated by the summary and analysis of his opinions in several 
constitutional and Sherman Act contexts in Comment, Mr. Justice Brandeis, Competition 
and Smallness: A Dilemma Re-Examined, 66 YALE L.J. 69 (1956). 
There is thus an interesting contrast between Brandeis' willingness to stretch in order 
to uphold state statutes and his willingness to stretch to lessen the impact of the federal 
antitrust laws upon private regulations of competition. This may seem a contradiction in 
his philosophy of the proper roles of legislatures and courts, but perhaps the anomaly dis- 
appears or is cast in a different light when one realizes that in both cases Brandeis exer- 
cised "his ingenious ability to contrive a rational basis" for the questioned statute or agree- 
ment in order to uphold restrictions on the operation of the free market. 
143. See pages 828, 832-47 infra. 
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in the future.1" The extent to which Brandeis' notions are still operative in the 
law is somewhat obscured by the failure of the institutions which make, en- 
force, and apply the law to develop sufficient economic sophistication to dis- 
tinguish consistently between agreements which "regulate" or eliminate com- 
petition for its own sake and those which do so as an inevitable incident in the 
creation of new efficiencies. It is thus sometimes difficult to know whether a 
particular decision is due to a Brandeisian view of the law's objectives or mere- 
ly to bad economics. 
The 1927 Trenton Potteries decision,145 a case in which Brandeis did not 
participate, contained an explicit repudiation of the broader implications of 
Chicago Board of Trade, and hence of Brandeis' approach to the rule of rea- 
son. Respondents, manufacturers and jobbers of vitreous pottery fixtures, had 
been convicted of violating the Sherman Act by forming a combination to fix 
prices and to limit sales to a special group of jobber respondents. The Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed for errors in the conduct of the trial 
and the government brought the case to the Supreme Court. 
Justice Stone's opinion for the Supreme Court, reversing the Court of Ap- 
peals, held not only that the trial court had properly refused to give as a jury 
instruction the passage from Board of Trade describing the rule of reason but 
that it had properly given a charge very similar to the proposition Brandeis 
had there rejected: . the law is clear that an agreement on the part of 
members of a combination controlling a substantial part of an industry, upon 
the prices which the members are to charge for their commodity, is in itself 
an undue and unreasonable restraint of trade and commerce."146 The holding 
by the Supreme Court that the trial court had properly refused what Brandeis 
had offered, and had properly charged what Brandeis had denied, must be 
taken as an outright rejection of Brandeis' version of the law. To nail the point 
down, Stone quickly distinguished and drastically curtailed the Board of Trade 
rationale: "That decision, dealing as it did with a regulation of a board of 
trade, does not sanction a price agreement among competitors in an open 
market such as is presented here."''4T Stone did not, however, specify the 
criteria of the rule of reason other than to state that the effect of an agreement 
upon competition was one. 
This repudiation of Brandeis' justification for price fixing was made firmer 
in Justice Douglas' Socony-Vacuum opinion in which he rejected as a defense 
the need to eliminate "competitive evils." "If the so-called competitive abuses 
were to be appraised here, the reasonableness of prices would necessarily be- 
come an issue in every price-fixing case. In that event the Sherman Act would 
soon be emasculated. ..."148 And in footnote 59, where for some reason he 
placed the law made by the case, Douglas said, "Whatever economic justifica- 
144. See text accompanying notes 160-74 infra. 
145. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927). 
146. Id. at 396. 
147. Id. at 401. 
148. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940). 
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tion particular price-fixing agreements may be thought to have, the law does 
not permit an inquiry into their reasonableness. They are all banned because 
of their actual or potential threat to the central nervous system of the econ- 
omy.''w49 
Language of this sort could be cited from any number of cases from Tren- 
ton Potteries on. And yet, simultaneously there are cases which permit the 
elimination of competition by price fixing or market division or other agree- 
ments not only when it is an incident to the creation of new efficiencies by 
combination but also when it is done, or justified as necessary, to regulate 
competition in order to remove "competitive evils" or to protect small com- 
petitors. 
The Appalachian Coals opinion 150 is a classic example of the mixing of these 
two strains of antitrust. It is instructive to separate them and see their differ- 
ences. Without the Brandeisian element the agreement in question there could 
never have been upheld, for the facts demonstrated a clear intent to cartelize 
and restrict output. In the trial court the government had won an injunction 
to prohibit 137 defendant producers of bituminous coal from combining to form 
and use an exclusive selling agency, Appalachian Coals, Inc. The producers 
owned all of the agency's capital stock, their holdings being in proportion to 
their production. Each producer, by a separate contract, designated Appalach- 
ian Coals an exclusive agent for the sale of its coal mined in Appalachian terri- 
tory. Appalachian Coals agreed to establish standard classifications of coal, to 
sell all the coal of its principals at the best prices obtainable and, if all the coal 
could not be sold, to apportion orders upon a stated basis. Prices were to be 
set by the officers of the agency at its central office. In order to preserve their 
existing sales outlets, producers were permitted to appoint subagents who 
would sell upon the terms and prices established by Appalachian Coals and 
would be allowed eight per cent commissions by it. 
Aside from the explicit price-fixing provisions, the use of a joint selling 
agency itself necessarily involved the establishment of uniform prices between 
the participating producers. Within any given grade the coal of the various 
producers was fungible and, as in any joint sales agency, economies of ship- 
ment, storage, and sale might on occasion have required commingling of the 
coal from various producers. It would hardly be practicable, in any event, for 
the selling agent to offer purchasers several different prices for identical 
batches of coal. Thus, an effect very much like an agreement on prices was in- 
evitable, and would seem to be inherent in any joint selling agency where the 
products of the participants are fungible, or, in fact, are to any degree sub- 
stitutable so that a shift in the price of one necessarily affects the price that 
can be gotten for the other. 
Upholding this elimination of competition gave Chief Justice Hughes no 
difficulty: "The mere fact that the parties to an agreement eliminate competi- 
tion between themselves is not enough to condemn it.... The familiar illus- 
149. Id. at 224 n.59. 
150. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933). 
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trations of partnerships, and enterprises fairly integrated in the interest of the 
promotion of commerce, at once occur. The question of the application of the 
statute is one of intent and effect, and is not to be determined by arbitrary 
assumptions."''5' Having determined, on the analogy of partnerships and other 
integrated enterprises, that the elimination of competition in the use of a joint 
selling agency was not per se unlawful (that is, not unlawful by its inherent 
nature), Hughes went on to examine defendants' share of the relevant market 
to determine whether their combination in a joint selling agency gave them 
power to affect market price 152 and to examine defendants' purposes to deter- 
mine whether their ultimate intention was the elimination of competition or 
the achievement of other valid ends.'53 Hughes concluded that the defendants 
would not possess power over prices, and among the purposes found were a 
number that involved the creation of new marketing and distribution efficien- 
cies.154 He recognized the similarity of the arrangement to a merger, stated 
that the same criteria applied,155 and held it lawful. 
The reasoning to that point was consistent with the three-part test enun- 
ciated by White in American Tobacco. Had there been no more to the opinion 
or the facts, Appalachian Coals would rank as a major opinion in the de- 
velopment of the main tradition of the rule of reason. Unfortunately, however, 
it is a case with a split personality. The facts displayed an unmistakable in- 
tention by the producers to eliminate competition and stabilize prices, and 
Hughes' opinion, in addition to the reasoning already discussed, exhibited a 
Brandeisian willingness to judge how much "regulation" and elimination of 
competition, as an end in itself, was an allowable or even praiseworthy goal. 
151. Id. at 360-61. 
152. Id. at 367-73. 
153. Id. at 366-67. 
154. The district court found, for example, that among the purposes of the combina- 
tion of defendants' selling functions in Appalachian Coals was the maintenance of an in- 
spection and engineering department which would keep in close touch with customers "in 
order to demonstrate the advantages and suitability of Appalachian Coal in comparison 
with other competitive coals"; the mounting of an extensive advertising campaign to show 
"the advantages of using coal as a fuel and the advantages of Appalachian coal particu- 
larly"; the creation of a research department employing combustion engineers which would 
demonstrate "proper and efficient methods of burning coal in factories and in homes" in 
order to aid in the competition with substitute fuels; and the operation of a credit depart- 
ment which would build up a record as to the "reliability of purchasers." Id. at 366-67. 
It might also be supposed that an advantage of consolidation in a single selling agent 
would be the saving of costs in that the joint agent might require fewer salesmen, office 
workers, and so forth, than the total of all the producers separately. 
155. The argument that integration may be considered a normal expansion of business, 
while a combination of independent producers in a common selling agency should 
be treated as abnormal - that one is a legitimate enterprise and the other is not 
makes but an artificial distinction. The Anti-Trust Act aims at substance. Nothing 
in theory or experience indicates that the selection of a common selling agency to 
represent a number of producers should be deemed to be more abnormal than the 
formation of a huge corporation bringing various independent units into one owner- 
ship. Either may be prompted by business exigencies and the statute gives to neither 
a special privilege. 
Id. at 377. 
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The coal producers' primary anticompetitive intent appeared on the face 
of their arrangement, for their contracts with the agent, Appalachian Coals, 
provided that, if all of their coal could not be sold, orders were to be appor- 
tioned among the participating producers. Since it would obviously be possible 
to sell all the producers' coal at the market price, particularly if one accepts 
their claim that they were but a small factor in the relevant market, the pro- 
vision for rationing orders can only be interpreted as the establishment of a 
system of quotas which is essential where restriction of production is contem- 
plated. That such a restriction of production would not be a mere foolish 
gesture because of the number of other sellers in the relevant market is prob- 
ably indicated by the fact that similar agencies were to be formed in other 
districts, including those which were competitive with Appalachian Coal.156 
The opinion, moreover, emphasized the deplorable condition of the coal in- 
dustry and the "destructive practices" which aggravated that condition. The 
elimination of these practices was said to be one of the purposes of the com- 
bination, -just as the regulation of competition had been said in Chicago Board 
of Trade to be aimed at the improvement of market conditions. But, just as 
the cited improvements there had little support in the record and less logical 
relation to the price-fixing aspect of the "call" rule, so, in Appalachian Coals, 
defendants' explanation of the destructive practices they were supposedly 
seeking to eliminate was so transparently nonsensical that it seems impossible 
the Court did not see through them. Perhaps it did, but chose to accept them 
anyway. A particularly outlandish argument, repeated straightface in the 
opinion, was that concerning the "pyramiding" of coal. This was said to 
occur when a producer authorized several persons to sell the same coal, and 
they in turn might offer it for sale to other dealers. Hughes quoted the district 
court's finding that, in consequence, "the coal competes with itself, thereby 
resulting in abnormal and destructive competition which depresses the price 
for all coals in the market."157 The suggestion was of course an absurdity. 
If one granted for the sake of argument that a network of dealers all offering 
the same ton of coal could depress its price and that this phenomenon could 
be so widespread as to depress the market price for coal, the net result would 
be more offers to purchase at the lower price than there were tons of coal 
forthcoming so that the price would immediately return to the level at which 
the amounts of coal offered and the amounts sought were equal and the 
market was cleared. Other "destructive practices" cited were of a similar 
transparency.'58 
156. Id. at 366. Perhaps additional indication of an intent to affect prices beyond the 
extent which was inherent in the formation of the joint sales agency appears in the pro- 
vision that the existing sales outlets were to be designated subagents and to conform their 
prices and terms to those set by Appalachian Coals. 
157. Id. at 363. 
158. One such "destructive practice" was said to be the shipping of "distress coal" 
on- consignment without prior orders. The argument was that purchasers' demand for coal 
was usually for particular sizes but that the production of the desired size entailed the 
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The Supreme Court's opinion accepted the elimination of these supposedly 
destructive practices as a legitimate reason for combination, despite the fact 
that the producers' only real objection to the practices was that they tended 
to lower the market price. Hughes' opinion is not clear on the question-of the 
legality of tampering with market price, partly, no doubt, because he was in 
the awkward position of approving attempts to alleviate depressed market 
prices by producers whom he had found were without sufficient market power 
to be able to fix prices. He sought to reconcile the conflict in a passage whose 
ingenuity and tone were reminiscent of the Chicago Board of Trade opinion: 
The contention is, and the court below found, that while defendants 
could not fix market prices, the concerted action would "affect" them, 
that is, that it would have a tendency to stabilize market prices and to 
raise them to a higher level than would otherwise obtain. But the facts 
found do not establish, and the evidence fails to show, that any effect 
will be produced which in the circumstances of this industry will be 
detrimental to fair competition. A co-operative enterprise, otherwise free 
from objection, which carries with it no monopolistic menace, is not to 
be condemned as an undue restraint merely because it may effect a change 
in market conditions, where the change would be in mitigation of recog- 
nized evils and would not impair, but rather foster, fair competitive 
opportunities.'59 
The juxtaposition of the two rationales in Appalachian Coals makes plain 
the difference between the Peckhamr-Taft-V\Thite and the Brandeis versions 
of the rule of reason. Movement from the former to the latter involved a shift 
from a consumer-oriented rule to a producer-oriented rule. The former rested 
production of other sizes which had not been ordered. Usually there were not storage 
facilities at the mine and the unwanted sizes were placed in cars on the producers' tracks. 
The tracks would sometimes become so congested that either production must be stopped 
or the cars moved regardless of demand. This led to the practice of shipping unsold coal 
to billing points or on consignment to the producer or his agent. If the coal was not sold 
by the time it reached its destination, and was not unloaded promptly, it became subject 
to demurrage charges which might exceed the amount obtainable for the coal unless it were 
sold quickly. This "distress coal," which was of all sizes and grades and of substantial 
quantity, was found to press on the market at all times and to aggravate the depressed 
condition of prices. Id. at 362-63. One of the stated purposes of the formation of Appalach- 
ian Coals was to stop the practice of shipping coal on consignment without prior orders. 
This of course was a clear admission of intent to restrict output, to increase prices by 
holding coal off the market. That intention is not less wrongful because of the argument 
advanced as to "distress coal." It is simply another form of the familiar spectre of "ruinous 
competition." If the production of one size of coal inevitably requires the production of 
other sizes, that is an economic phenomenon of a type familiar to many industries. So long 
as it proves profitable for a producer to continue to operate in the manner described, tak- 
ing his total profits and losses from all sizes of coal, there is no problem. Should it prove 
unprofitable, it means simply that too many producers, or, more accurately, too many re- 
sources are engaged in the production of coal. The best response is to allow the distress to 
continue until the excess resources have moved out. Restricting the output prevents that 
and continues the misallocation of resources. Defendants should have lost the case on their 
their own argument about "distress coal" alone. 
159. Id. at 373-74. 
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justification for combination in the achievement of efficiencies; the latter found 
justification for combination in the greater comfort or security of the producers. 
This Brandeis rule of reason may also be discerned in more recent cases. 
It appears, for example, rather unexpectedly in Justice Douglas' reversal in 
Paramount 160 of the district court's decree that all defendant distributors 
license their films only on a competitive bidding basis. Among the reasons 
Douglas gave was that competitive bidding would favor exhibitors with the 
"longest purse" to the detriment of the "smaller independents."'6' Something 
of the same spirit may perhaps be discernible both in subsequent lower court 
decisions and in the government's enforcement efforts concerning the motion 
picture industry. One of the reasons lower courts have, for example, seemed 
sympathetic to "splits" - agreements between exhibitors in individual cities 
to divide particular distributors' film offerings so as not to bid against each 
other - appears to be that competitive bidding might force some exhibitors 
out of business.'62 This fear seems also to have stayed the government from 
any all-out attack on the "split" system of film distribution.'63 This is in sharp 
contrast to the usual insistence of the courts and the government on the per 
se illegality of horizontal market division.'64 
Justice Douglas' White Motor 165 opinion occupies a somewhat ambiguous 
position with respect to these issues. The case may reflect a tension between the 
Douglas of Socony-Vacuurn and the Douglas of Paramount. Quoting from an- 
other case, Douglas said in White Motor that the category of per se violations 
was composed of "agreements or practices which because of their pernicious 
effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively pre- 
sumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to 
the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use."'166 Fall- 
ing within this class of restraints were tying arrangements, horizontal market 
divisions, group boycotts, and price fixing, both vertical and horizontal. This, 
however, was the Court's first experience with market division (by territorial 
limitation and by customer allocation) in a vertical arrangement, and, said 
160. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948). 
161. Id. at 164. 
162. See, for example, the remarks of the court in Brown v. Western Massachusetts 
Theatres, Inc., 288 F.2d 302, 305 (1st Cir. 1961). The desire to soften competition in order 
to protect exhibitors seems also to be a recurring theme in other motion picture industry 
litigation. See Comment, An Experiment in Preventive Antitrust: Judicial Regulation of 
the Motion Picture Market Under the Paramount Decrees, in a forthcoming issue of the 
Yale Law Journal. 
163. So far the government appears to have confined itself to efforts to ensure that all 
exhibitors in an area who wished to do so were permitted to join in "splitting" arrange- 
ments on an equitable basis. See letter of Lee Loevinger, Assistant Attorney General, Anti- 
trust Division, to Edward Bennett Williams, attached as an appendix to Petitioner's Brief 
in Viking Theatre Corp. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 378 U.S. 123 (1964). 
164. White Motor suggests that "splits" might be lawful if analyzed as vertical re- 
straints but most of the cases appear not to have been litigated or decided on that basis. 
165. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963). 
166. Id. at 262. 
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Douglas, the Court knew too little of its actual economic impact to fashion 
the rule of per se illegality that would have been necessary to sustain the sum- 
mary judgment granted by the district court. But at this point the opinion 
falters. It does not specify the contours of the investigation to be conducted 
by the district court upon remand. Instead, as a statement of the rule of 
reason, which "normally requires an ascertainment of the facts peculiar- to 
the particular business," Douglas quoted, without comment, the full passage 
from Brandeis' Chicago Board of Trade opinion.167 Other than its extremely 
vague, perhaps meaningless, distinction between the regulation and the sup- 
pression of competition by private agreement, this passage offers very little 
guidance concerning the criteria that control legality, and what it does offer 
seems incompatible with the existence of any per se rule. Yet it stands, in- 
scrutable, at the center of the White Motor opinion. Perhaps its use merely 
signifies and compensates for the Court's continuing inability to generalize 
in a meaningful way the economic standards that control the incidence of the 
per se rule in this area. This is a traditional role of the Board of Trade opinion. 
But perhaps the use of that opinion signifies more, for, subsequently, in sug- 
gesting some of the justifications that might be open for arrangements such 
as White's, Douglas introduced values which sound Brandeisian: the arrange- 
ments might be "allowable protections against aggressive competitors or the 
only practicable means a small company has for breaking into or staying in 
business . . . and within the 'rule of reason"'"68 and, as an analogy from a 
different statutory setting, a "merger that would otherwise offend the anti- 
trust laws because of a substantial lessening of competition has been given 
immunity where the acquired company was a failing one."1'69 
Concern for the preservation of small competitors, as a value in itself, is 
inconsistent with the stress placed by the main tradition, reflected in the per 
se rule, on permitting the forces of competition in the market to work them- 
selves out. If the opinion meant simply that the main purpose and effect of 
the vertical allocation of territories and customers was the creation of effi- 
ciency rather than the elimination of competition for its own sake, then that 
should be justification enough, whether or not the added efficiency was within 
the vague classes of "allowable protections against aggressive competitors" 
or "the only practicable means a small company has for breaking into or 
staying in business." Insofar as these criteria raise any considerations other 
than the general desirability of increased efficiency they are suspiciously similar 
to the considerations which moved Brandeis in Chicago Board of Trade and 
Hughes and the Court in Appalachian Coals. 
167. Ibid. 
168. Id. at 263, citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 330 (1962), 
and United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 560-61 (E.D. Pa. 1960), 
aff'd, 365 U.S. 567 (1961). 
169. Id. at 263-64, citing International Shoe Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 280 
U.S. 291, 302-03 (1930). 
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The approach here termed Brandeis' is, of course, by no means confined 
to his opinions. Traces of it are to be found throughout the body of the anti- 
trust laws. In its most specific form, this approach may be defined as a willing- 
ness on the part of courts to give independent weight to the preservation and 
welfare of small business, even when- that involves sacrificing to some degree 
the interests of consumers.'70 Chicago Board of Trade reflects this tendency 
by attaching significance to the belief that the restraint under review spread 
business to more traders and enforced a degree of leisure. Similar concern for 
small business as an independent value may be seen not only in the examples 
already cited - Appalachian Coals, Paramount, other motion picture litigation, 
and, perhaps, White Motor - but in a number of other cases, including Judge 
Learned Hand's opinion in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America'71 
and, increasingly, in merger opinions such as Brown Shoe Co. v. United 
States.'72 
Stated more generally, the Brandeis tradition may be described as the incli- 
nation on the part of some courts to consider a very broad range of values, 
even noneconomic values, in the decision of antitrust cases. Conspicuous ex- 
amples of this were Judge Learned Hand's opinion applying First Amendment 
considerations through the Sherman Act in United States v. Associated 
Press,'73 and Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in the Supreme Court 
affirming the decision on the same grounds. There may be reason to believe as 
well that the enforcement policy pursued by the government is sometimes in- 
fluenced by considerations other than consumer welfare.'74 Because this article 
focuses primarily on problems of price fixing and market division, consider- 
ation of the Brandeisian tradition will be confined to its influence in those 
areas. Much of -what is said could, nevertheless, be applied broadly to the 
influence of that tradition throughout antitrust. 
-It seems clear, then, that to some undefined extent the rule of reason today 
continues to hold within itself the separate and very different policy strands 
of the Peckham-Taft-White tradition and of the Brandeis tradition. While 
confusion may have had its uses, it seems time that the rule of reason in this 
most basic of areas be clarified and made consistent. 
170. That this was a strong element of Brandeis' judicial philosophy is demonstrated 
in Comment, Mr. Justice Brandeis, Competition and Smallness; A Dilemma Re-Examined, 
-66 YALE L.J. 69 (1956). 
171. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
172. 370 U.S. 294 (1962). 
173. 52 F. Supp. 362 (1943). 
174. In addition to its positions in motion picture industry litigation, see notes 162 and 
163 supra, the government has, for example, apparently sometimes refrained from prosecut- 
ing concerted boycotts by farmers' groups which were intended to gain higher than market 
prices for their products. Various industry codes of ethics or standards for products have 
also often gone unchallenged, seemingly because of approval of the motives of the industry, 
despite the fact that a mode of competition which some consumers liked was thereby elimi- 
nated. Agreements on cigarette advertising, and types of motion pictures and television 
programs come at once to mind. 
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ASSESSMENT OF THE POLICY OBJECTIVES 
OF THE DIVERGENT THEMES IN THE RULE OF REASON 
A necessary step toward coherent doctrine is the elimination of the confusion 
concerning goals which seems partially responsible for the law's vacillation 
between the Peckham-Taft-White tradition and the Brandeis version of the 
rule of reason. The superiority for the law relating to price fixing and market 
divison of the policy objectives of the main tradition seems clear. The point 
requires discussion, nevertheless, 'because the values expressed' by Justice 
Brandeis, whether due to his prestige or for independent reasons, have con- 
tinued in the modern cases and in enforcement policy. 
The Policy Inherent in the Main Tradition 
Judges in the main tradition have never been very articulate about the ul- 
timate values served by the law of price fixing and market division. It seems 
clear, nevertheless, that implicit in the approach of the main tradition of the 
rule of reason is the policy of assisting the economy to maximize wealth (de- 
fined as consumer want satisfaction). 
It need not be demonstrated further -that the Peckham-Taft-White view 
rejected the reasonable price formulation of the law and that it held per se 
illegal all agreements whose sole purpose or effect was- to suppress compe- 
tition. None of the cases of that tradition, however, took the preservation of 
competition as the law's sole guide. They could hardly have done so, since 
as Justice Holmes demonstrated in his Northern Securities dissent, devotion 
to the principle that persons who can compete may not combine would require 
the dissolution of all productive units in our society consisting of more than a 
single person. 
Though inaccurate, it. is natural to slip into the shorthand of speaking of 
the purpose-of the antitrust laws as being the preservation or the promotion 
of competition because the event that triggers the law is always the elimination 
of competition by agreement. Yet it is a loose usage that has its dangers, for 
it invites the further erroneous conclusion that the elimination of competition 
by agreement must always be' illegal. This -sort of slippage seems to account 
for Justice Clark's dissent in White Motor and for Justice Douglas' state- 
ments about horizontal agreements in his Penn-Olin dissent. 
Peckham avoided this pitfall by conceiving the evil banned through the term 
"restraint of trade" as the suppression of competition in the general market. 
Taft escaped it with his concept of ancillarity, and White did so with his dis- 
tinction between agreements normal in trade and those creating the evils of 
monopoly. Not every elimination of competition, of course, entails the conse- 
quences of monopoly. Yet, if these judges avoided the unworkable rigidity of 
a per se rule against all' eliminations of competition, on one side, they were 
less successful, on the other, in articulating a general theory of permissible 
eliminations-of competition. Peckham stated no useful general rule, nor did 
White, beyond the idea that normal contracts not attended by the evils of 
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monopoly were lawful. Taft offered only the unhelpful generalization that 
lawful agreements not to compete were those necessary to secure to a party 
the "legitimate fruits" of his contract or to protect him from "an unjust use of 
those fruits by the other party." 
These early cases of the main tradition, however, contain lines of approach 
from which we can extrapolate the policy that necessarily underlies the de- 
cisions. This is possible and legitimate even though that policy may never 
have been explicitly formulated in any judge's mind. The policy, as already 
indicated, is the maximization of wealth or consumer want satisfaction. It 
may be derived from the distinction the Sherman Act courts made between 
cartels and mergers, from the examples of the lawful elimination of compe- 
tition given by the courts, and from their insistence that competition played 
a central role in the law. 
The difference in treatment accorded by the Sherman Act to loose and 
integrated combinations has been termed "one of the most provocative anoma- 
lies in the law."'175 It is true of course that the law has long regarded cartels 
and mergers - which is what is meant here by loose and integrated combina- 
tions - as polar models. From Trans-Missouri on, cartels have been treated 
by the main tradition of the law as beyond any possibility of justification, while 
the greater solicitude of Sherman Act courts for mergers is well known. Even 
under the more stringent provisions of amended section 7 of the Clayton Act 
horizontal mergers are certainly not per se illegal. The law, therefore, has 
treated and continues to treat differently two forms of agreement which are 
alike in that they eliminate competition. The disparity is indeed provocative 
but, as analysis demonstrates, it is far from anomalous. It is, more accurately, 
basic to any economically rational antitrust policy.'70 Moreover, it is explain- 
able only in terms of a policy of wealth maximization. The only difference 
between the two forms of elimination of competition which suggests a more 
lenient attitude toward mergers is that cartels contain no possibility of the 
creation of efficiencies, their sole purpose and effect being the restriction of 
output, while mergers may or may not enable the achievement of efficiencies.277 
175. Jaffe & Tobriner, The Legality of Price-Fixing Agreements, 45 HARV. L. REV. 
1164 (1932). 
176. Absent a distinction between cartels and mergers, the law could only hold both 
per se lawful, hold both per se unlawful, or attempt to hold some cartels as well as some 
mergers lawful. The first possibility would destroy any reason to have an antitrust policy; 
the second would lead to the useless destruction of an important means of creating effi- 
ciency, and, if the economic identity of mergers and other forms of combination be ad- 
mitted, would, as Holmes saw, require the dissolution of almost all productive units. The 
third possibility requires the making of distinctions among kinds of cartels and thus in- 
troduces the irrationalities of what is here termed the Brandeis rule of reason. For a dis- 
cussion of the irrationality of that approach, see pages 834-35 infra. 
177. It seems difficult to imagine another value which would suggest greater tolera- 
tion for mergers than for cartels since, aside from their efficiency-creating potential, 
mergers might seem less socially desirable. They eliminate competition between the agree- 
ing parties more completely, limit their freedom more thoroughly, and they are more per- 
manent. 
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The operative significance thus given to efficiency in the production and dis- 
tribution of goods and services necessarily derives from a desire to increase 
the wealth of the society. 
A similar, though perhaps less certain, inference can be drawn from the 
examples of lawful eliminations of competition given by Peckham and Taft. 
Peckham's list in Joint Traffic was particularly suggestive because most of 
it - the formation of corporations for business or manufacturing purposes, 
the contract of partnership, the appointment by two or more producers of 
the same person to sell their goods on commission, a lease or purchase by a 
farmer, manufacturer or merchant of an additional farm, manufactory or 
shop - consisted of examples of consolidations which, like mergers, are 
capable of creating efficiencies. Similarly, the example that Taft justified by 
policy argument, the agreement of partners not to compete during the part- 
nership, was an instance of consolidation, and Taft found it valid because 
it aided the partners to accomplish "a union of their capital, enterprise, and 
energy to carry on a successful business, and one useful to the community." 
This explanation is phrased in terms of wealth-creating efficiencies. Some of 
Peckham's and Taft's other examples, such as the covenant by the seller of 
a business not to compete with it subsequently, are not perhaps so obvious, 
and may upon analysis turn out to be incorrect applications, but they appear 
to reflect the same policy. The justification for the covenant ancillary to the 
sale of a business, for example, is often said to be that without it the business 
could not be sold and so might be carried on less effectively by the aging 
original owner or perhaps be liquidated. This, too, is an explanation couched 
in terms of desire for more efficient resource use. 
Finally, however, the law's avowed concern with the promotion of compe- 
tition indicates that wealth is the ultimate goal of the law, for, as the 
courts have recognized in making the exceptions and distinctions just dis- 
cussed, the policy of promoting competition is only half a policy. Competition 
is the name of a process, not of an ultimate desideratum, and so implies a 
further value. There are a variety of reasons why competition is popularly 
imagined to be useful - it is said, for example, to assist dispersion of political 
and social power in the community, to spur technological innovation, and 
so on - but in economic analysis competition is most admired as one means 
of assisting in the creation of wealth, or, to say the same thing, the maximiza- 
tion of the satisfaction of consumer wants. Moreover, - and this is a crucial 
consideration - if the alternative values mentioned had been viewed by the 
courts as underlying to any significant degree the policy of preserving com- 
petition, there would have been available no firm criteria for the decision of 
particular cases. The fact that the courts have insisted upon such criteria, as 
will be shown in the discussion of the superiority of the main tradition to the 
Brandeis tradition, indicates that they could not have given weight to these 
alternative values. A policy of dispersing power (of the non-market varieties 
mentioned) has no built-in stopping place short of grinding society down to 
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an aggregation of individual producers. There is no counter consideration 
which could inform a judge when some other value should override that of 
dispersing private power without involving him in the grossest sort of political 
judgment. The counter consideration cannot be efficiency because there is 
no criterion for choosing between efficiency and dispersal of power when the 
two conflict. They have no common denominator. The goal of promoting 
innovation is ruled out not only because it seems inconsistent with the main 
tradition's stress on the per se concept, but because there exists no science 
or -set of meaningful criteria which indicates how much competition or elimi- 
nation of competition is most effective in reaching the goal. Nor are there 
any criteria fit for judicial employment which even suggest whether, in a 
given case, it would be desirable to sacrifice more or less consumer satisfaction 
of other wants by devoting more or fewer resources to the promotion of 
innovation. 
It is only when competition is viewed as subordinate to the ultimate value 
of creating wealth that there exists a social science - that of economics- 
which courts may properly use to measure the amount of competition that 
is desirable. Though the estimate may often be rough, basic economic concepts 
suggest such criteria as the degree of fusion of the productive efforts of the 
parties, the amount of competition which must be- eliminated to attain that 
fusion, the market share created and probable speed of entry of new com- 
petitors into the market as the means for judging whether the net effect of 
a specific agreement or combination is likely to be efficiency or restriction 
of output. Net effect upon wealth is the common denominator which 
permits judicial comparison of elimination of competition and efficiency 
in the decision of cases. There is thus provided a conceptual apparatus able 
to accomplish what Holmes thought could not be done if competition were 
a concern of the law - it stops the policy of promoting competition short 
of the complete atomization of society. And it is an apparatus capable of 
locating and describing the stopping point so that antitrust attains the 
virtues appropriate to good law by becoming capable of giving fair warning 
to those who must obey, susceptible of principled administration by the courts 
that apply it, and able to divide with tolerable precision conduct which is 
socially advantageous from that which is socially disadvantageous. 
These matters will be taken up after a short discussion of the policies seem- 
ingly implicit in the Brandeis tradition of the rule of reason. 
The Policies Underlying the Brandeis Tradition 
The policies which find expression in the Brandeis rule of reason are 
somewhat more difficult to isolate and identify. Both in Brandeis' opinions 
and in. that aspect of Hughes' opinion in Appalachian Coals which derives 
from Brandeis, there is an intertwining of policy arguments that make the 
position difficult to capsulate. This difficulty, as has already been suggested, 
may be an element of strength in the Brandeis tradition, making it both more 
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useful for courts seeking escape from an overly confining per se formula and 
more difficult to attack directly as containing values not properly implemented 
through antitrust. 
Staying clear, for the moment, of the wide range of social values that are 
sometimes ascribed to Brandeis and sticking to those goals his opinions 
singled out as appropriate for the rule of reason, it seems possible to discern 
several discrete elements. In Brandeis' view, agreements eliminating or "regu- 
lating" competition may be saved from illegality because they: (1) Spread 
the available business among more firms; (2) achieve some purpose with a 
"special appeal;" such as shortening the working day or limiting -the period 
of most exacting activity; (3) spread information concerning market con- 
ditions; or (4) lessen risks-, perhaps thereby enabling the charging of lower 
prices. If Appalachian Coals is classified as in large part within the Brandeis 
tradition, we may add, (5) make competition more "healthy" by ridding the 
market of particular "competitive evils" or "abuses." 
The last three effects mentioned need not be at odds with a policy of maxi- 
mizing consumer want satisfaction. The spreading of information does con- 
tain the possibility of increasing efficiency so that a question in each case 
would be whether some elimination of competition was necessary to that 
purpose or whether the spreading of the information was- merely a pretext 
for an elimination of competition. A similar question could be asked about 
agreements whose benefit is said to be the elimination of risk. The elimination 
of "competitive evils" is an ambiguous goal, not inherently outside the values 
of the main tradition. The difficulty with it is that, as in Appalachian Coals, 
the "evil" to be eliminated almost invariably turns out to be competition. 
When that is the case there seems no difficulty in rejecting the policy as in- 
consistent with consumer welfare, though an occasional court may have diffi- 
culty in penetrating the vocabulary and specious economic reasoning to per- 
ceive the cartel nature of the agreement. 
The other two factors - spreading the business among more persons, and 
the achievement of other appealing purposes - are those that are probably 
most distinctive in the Brandeis approach. They represent both that tradi- 
tion's specific concern for small business and its more general toleration or 
encouragement of a continuing value-choosing role for the courts. It is the 
contention here that Brandeis' introduction of considerations which run coun- 
ter to the policy of maximizing consumer want satisfaction has no proper 
place in the rule of reason. 
The Superiority of the Main Tradition's Policy 
The policy of maximizing wealth is preferable to the policies of the Brandeis 
tradition for implementation by- the law of price fixing and market division 
because: (1) The courts are required to make only distinctions which corres- 
pond to economic reality; (2) the wealth-maximizing policy is better suited 
to the scope, nature, and ease of administration of the law; (3) the task of 
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selecting the basic values to be implemented is given to the proper organ of 
government, the legislature, and not left for case-by-case selection by the 
courts; and (4) the law is provided with standards of the requisite certainty. 
The Economic Reality of the Distinctions Required 
It is clear that there exists an objective economic difference between an 
agreements whose sole purpose and effect is to suppress competition so that 
greater profits may be made through a restriction of output and an agreement 
whose sole purpose and effect is to increase profits through the achievement 
of greater efficiencies in production and distribution. They differ in their im- 
pact upon consumers, which is the ultimate criterion of the main tradition. 
Thus, there is a real difference between an agreement among 100 producers 
to sell at the same price and an agreement between two of them to employ 
a common sales agent. And this difference is not destroyed by the fact that 
it is possible to imagine difficult cases, such as the agreement by 50 to use 
one sales agent and by the other 50 to use a second sales agent. 
The distinctions of the Brandeis tradition, however, seem not to inhere 
in the phenomena under observation so much as in the vocabulary of the 
tradition. The suggestion in Chicago Board of Trade that an agreement on 
prices may be lawful where it operates to spread the business to more firms 
does not offer a useful distinction between types of price-fixing or market- 
dividing agreements. By eliminating competition and raising the rate of return 
all cartel agreements may spread the business. They make it likely that more 
firms will survive, and, indeed, that more will enter the industry. There is, 
therefore, not one kind of cartel that spreads business and another kind that 
does not. If the suggested distinction cuts anywhere, it is in favor of all cartel 
agreements and against agreements such as partnerships and joint sales 
agencies which, by creating efficiency, tend somewhat to concentrate rather 
than spread business.178 Here the Brandeis tradition seems either to suggest 
distinctions which do not exist or else to prefer the restriction of output in- 
herent in cartelization to the creation of efficiency. 
The achievement of other "appealing" purposes, of which the creation of 
leisure by the limitation of business hours may be taken as typical, usually 
involves an attempt to achieve benefits for the agreeing parties. These agree- 
ments, however, are indistinguishable in principle from ordinary cartel agree- 
ments. Leisure and money are merely different forms of income. When they 
are obtained by agreed restrictions of output at the expense of consumers 
there seems no valid way to distinguish between them. 
It is, presumably, more likely that a judge in the Brandeis tradition would 
uphold an agreement by automobile dealers to close on Sundays than an agree- 
178. Thus it may be significant that Justice Douglas in White Motor suggested as an 
appropriate test whether the restrictions in question enabled a relatively small competitor 
to survive. The idea seemed to be that the creation of efficiency through such restraints 
might be limited to smaller and presumably otherwise less efficient companies. This may 
be a notion of spreading the efficiencies as a way of spreading the business. 
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ment by the same dealers to add $50 to the price of each car. The difference 
that seems to exist between the cases on first impression, however, disappears 
under analysis. In addition to the fact that both are limitations upon compe- 
tition whose sole purpose is to increase income by restricting output, it is 
obvious that the parties can switch the results of the agreements. Auto dealers 
with Sundays off can work elsewhere on those days; and dealers with higher 
prices per car can elect to take their increased income in the form of Sundays 
off. The Brandeisian distinction between the two forms of agreement really 
rests upon the unanalyzed difference between the psychological associations 
relating to leisure and money. A court that takes the difference seriously 
ought to decide the automobile dealer cases only after learning whether the 
free Sundays were used for laudable or for vicious purposes, and whether 
the increased income was given to charity and spent on the children's educa- 
tion or squandered in nightclubs. Aside from this sort of test, which we are 
unlikely to import into the antitrust law or to entrust to courts, there is really 
no valid economic distinction on the producer side between any cartel and 
the agreement Brandeis found "appealing." 
From the consumers' point of view such agreements are also indistinguish- 
able. Consumers who lose the convenience of shopping on Sunday are deprived 
of something that is as much an economic good as is $50.179 There is no ac- 
ceptable way for a judge to decide that a restriction in the offering of a con- 
venience is any less objectionable than a restriction in the number of auto- 
mobiles sold. 
The Brandeis approach, therefore, either becomes a rule of per se legality 
for cartel agreements or else degenerates into the making of subjective dis- 
tinctions that do not correspond to any objective and significant differences 
in the phenomena concerned. 
The Scope, Nature, and Ease of Administration of the Law 
Though it may not by itself be a conclusive point, it is surely preferable 
that the policy read into a law be one which the law by its structure and cover- 
age is able to implement efficiently. This consideration, too, favors the main 
tradition of the rule of reason. 
Any law will, of course, be most effective if it deals with all or most of 
the instances of behavior which are directly relevant to the values it seeks 
to maximize. Section 1 of the Sherman Act is thus better suited to implement 
a policy of wealth maximization than a broad, open class of values which 
the courts would presumably be free to choose and implement under any 
generally Brandeisian approach. Two factors relating to the Act's scope 
and nature indicate its greater suitability as a tool of wealth maximization: 
(1) It scans only the field of contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in 
restraint of trade; and (2) it is entirely prohibitive. The pertinence of the 
first consideration lies in the fact that the described agreements and combi- 
179. An economic good is here defined simply as something that consumers want. 
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nations comprise only a minor segment of the full range of private actions 
and inactions which may advance or impede the variety of social values which 
a judge of the Brandeis tradition might find attractive. Even a value so closely 
related to trade and commerce as the creation of leisure may not be effectively 
dealt with in the context of agreements. Traders who refuse to close on 
Sundays or who work long hours may never make an agreement that can 
be reached by the Sherman Act but may, nevertheless, sacrifice not only their 
own leisure but that of their less industrious rivals. The problem, if it is one, 
can be dealt with better by Sunday closing laws or legislation regulating hours 
of trading or work. If section 1 of the Sherman Act is only a haphazard and 
inefficient means of promoting such values, however, it is well suited to the 
policy of wealth maximization because the events which trigger it - agree- 
ments and combinations restraining trade - constitute probably the primary 
means by which traders seek the market control necessary to the restriction 
of output.180 
The second consideration - the wholly prohibitory nature of the Sherman 
Act - means that it is effective only to screen conduct which private parties 
themselves initiate. The law is wholly unable to serve values which must be 
implemented by coercing or inducing affirmative conduct that the self-interest 
or capabilities of private persons do not cause or permit them to undertake. 
It is somewhat difficult to cite examples to clarify this point because the 
Brandeis tradition has never flowered sufficiently to indicate the breadth 
of the values that courts might choose to implement under it. To choose a 
perhaps not unlikely hypothetical related to commerce, one can imagine that 
a Brandeisian judge might be impressed with the idea that the family farm 
and the way of life it is thought to involve are important to the social and 
political health of the society. This is a notion very like the idea that small 
business is socially, if not always economically, desirable. These ideas might 
suggest that agriculture and other industries populated by small units should 
be permitted to cartelize. If, however, the members of such an industry choose 
not to cartelize, or if their numbers or other factors, make cartelization un- 
feasible, the passive nature of the Sherman Act would render the judge 
powerless to implement the chosen value. It is, in fact, likely that it is pre- 
cisely those industries characterized by many small producers that a Bran- 
deisian judge would simultaneously most wish and be least able to help. The 
welfare of industries so structured is thus better left to laws - such as direct 
180. Section 1 of the Sherman Act, of course, actually speaks of contracts, combina- 
tions and conspiracies in restraint of trade. If this were read broadly, without regard to 
the preservation of competition, then the law would apply to all agreements relating in 
any way to trade, for, as Brandeis noted in Chicago Board of Trade, every contract re- 
strains. To read the Act this way would expand its scope and make it more useful for the 
implementation of a variety of broad social policies, but it would be tantamount to a dele- 
gation to judges to exercise the entire commerce power through the Sherman Act. 
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subsidies or tax relief - which affirmatively encourage the desired form of 
activity. There seems no rational design in entrusting to judges a free value- 
choosing role under a statute which haphazardly limits their effectiveness 
to those values which by chance happen to be capable of implementation 
through a wholly prohibitive law. 
It does make sense, however, to give judges a prohibitory law when the 
value to be maximized is wealth. Producers destroy, as well as create, the 
wealth of society in large part through the integration of activities and fa- 
cilities - that is, through agreements and combinations. The net effect 
is destruction of wealth when the integration's chief purpose or effect is the 
restriction of output. Creation of wealth occurs when the net effect is the 
creation of efficiency. Since producers are powerfully motivated by self- 
interest to attempt both kinds of integration, we may confidently rely upon 
their affirmative actions to bring all relevant conduct to the passive screen 
of a statute which is so drawn or interpreted as to cover all forms of integra- 
tion which eliminate competition and- to strike down only those whose net 
effect is to decrease wealth. When it is keyed to wealth creation, in fact, the 
Sherman Act's passive or prohibitory nature becomes one of its prime vir- 
tues. Affirmative wealth-creating behavior cannot effectively be commanded 
by courts at the instigation of public prosecutors. The opportunities for effi- 
ciency-producing integrations and the forms they should take are matters 
obviously better left to the superior numbers, information, and incentive 
of entrepreneurs. 
Assuming the propriety of the broad social values mentioned above and 
others like them, it seems clear that they are not effectively implemented 
by a law which is both keyed to agreements and combinations and entirely 
prohibitive, but are better promoted by statutes such as those dealing with 
subsidies, tax relief, minimum retail markups, Sunday closing, wages and 
hours, safety standards and the like. 
The choice of the wealth-maximization policy has the additional benefit 
of making the law more easily predicted, enforced, and applied. This touches 
upon the whole topic of vagueness and uncertainty, but here it is necessary 
to refer only to the fact that the policy of wealth maximization leads naturally 
to a broad and clear category of agreements illegal per se and to the use of 
objective criteria outside the per se area, while the Brandeis approach does 
not. In the main tradition, agreements which eliminate competition and have 
no tendency to create efficiency are illegal without more and the court's only 
task is to discover whether the alleged agreement exists. The benefits of a 
broad per se category in ease of enforcement and predictability are so great 
that its legitimate availability constitutes one of the main tradition's chief 
assets. 
The problem is more difficult where the elimination of competition is 
plausibly claimed to be indissolubly linked to the creation of efficiency. The 
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court may then resort to economic analysis to decide whether the claimed 
connection exists, and use such indicia as market share and ease of entry 
into the industry to determine whether the net impact of the arrangement 
will be to the benefit or detriment of consumers. 
The Brandeis approach has no natural place for a per se rule. The main 
tradition's policy of wealth maximization requires no balancing in a cartel 
case because the effect of the agreement is only to restrict output. But the 
Brandeis tradition requires comparison of benefits to producers and benefits to 
consumers. Since the elimination of competition by agreement always benefits 
some producers a full trial and a balancing operation are required before any 
agreement may be held unlawful. An additional contrast to the main tradition's 
balancing operation outside the per se area in cases involving both the elimina- 
tion of competition and the creation of efficiency is that the Brandeis approach 
does not lend itself to objective economic criteria. A court using the Brandeis 
rule of reason could perhaps attempt to cure these objections, though neces- 
sarily creating others simultaneously, by drawing hard, arbitrary lines as to 
permissible behavior. Thus, it might decide that though agreements to take 
time off were usually lawful, agreements on prices were always illegal. Aside 
from the objection that the benefits of a per se rule had been purchased at the 
expense of economic rationality, this procedure would be likely to achieve only 
limited success, for it would merely invite cartelists to take their additional 
income in approved rather than disapproved currency. The seeming flatness 
and effectiveness of the rule would thus be largely illusory. 
The existing scope and nature of the Sherman Act, as well as considerations 
of effective administration, thus indicate that the statute is better suited to 
implement the policy of wealth maximization than the policies underlying the 
Brandeis approach. 
The Roles of the Courts and the Legislature in Choosing Values 
and Making Interpersonal Comparisons 
Because the main tradition serves the single, unchanging value of wealth 
maximization it does not require the courts to choose or weigh ultimate values 
in the decision of individual cases or in the continuing evolution of doctrine. 
Neither are the courts involved in making comparisons of and choices between 
persons and groups of persons. Their decisions will, of course, necessarily 
affect the distribution of income both as between groups of producers and as 
between particular producers and consumers, but the courts are not permitted 
by the main tradition to take these effects into account in the decision of cases. 
In cartel cases, of course, the per se concept eliminates any problem of weighing 
or comparison. Outside the per se area, the courts consider only the benefit 
of consumers as a class by considering the probable net effect of the elimina- 
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tion of competition and the creation of efficiency. The courts are thereby 
enabled to be impersonal in an important and desirable sense. 
The Brandeis tradition lacks these virtues. Unless it legitimizes all cartels, 
it requires the courts continually to choose values and to make political choices 
between classes of citizens. Brandeis did not suggest how courts were to choose 
values, merely remarking that restraints tending to shorten the business day 
made a "special appeal" and assuming that the distribution of business to a 
larger number of persons was desirable on its face. Other judges working 
in this tradition would presumably feel free to decide what values appealed 
to them from time to time. The choice of ultimate values, however, is usually 
regarded as a function of the legislature and not of the courts. This is particu- 
larly important when it is realized that the implementation of such values 
is not costless and necessarily involves taxing some individuals to benefit 
others. The decision by a court to permit grain traders to increase their leisure 
by agreement, for example, or to permit coal producers to stabilize market 
price, or to forbid large manufacturers to achieve efficiencies in ways open 
to their smaller rivals, is to decide in each case to redistribute income from 
consumers to particular favored producers and also, in some cases, to take 
it from some producers and give it to others. This means that in each case 
the court is involved in income redistribution on the basis of inter-personal 
comparisons. There can be few more intensely political determinations and 
few for which the judicial process is less suited. 
The main tradition takes a pro-consumer policy as the base rule and requires 
exceptions in particular cases to be made by the legislature, as in the labor 
laws, the farm program, and the tariff laws.18' The Brandeis approach, which 
seems either to be without a base value or to permit the free creation of ex- 
ceptions to the base, is fundamentally no different than if a court decided 
to allow farmers to cartelize because it admired the virtues of agrarian life 
or undertook to impose a duty upon certain imported goods in order to pro- 
tect particular producers whose case it found "appealing." The making of 
exceptions in favor of particular producers, however, is a task for the elected, 
representative, and explicitly political organs of government. The Brandeis 
tradition thus involves a serious usurpation of a legislative function by the 
judicial arm. 
181. Even if it be granted that the courts initially participated in choosing the policy 
of the law in this area, it remains true that the main tradition has the advantage of per- 
mitting the courts to stand by the original direction they gave the statute and to leave to 
Congress any further determination of basic goals. The participation of the courts in setting 
the initial policy of the statute may not have been wholly or unduly legislative. Congress 
had been concerned with the preservation of competition in passing the Sherman Act. The 
courts took that concern, and the necessary further values and criteria it implied, and 
created the present structure of the law. Perhaps the courts of the main tradition ignored 
other values that were mentioned in the legislative history, but the argument in the text, 
at pages 834 supra and 840-47 infra, indicates that that was perhaps the only course open 
to them which could make the law both sensible and sufficiently certain. 
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The-Need for Standards 
By serving a single value the Peckham-Taft-White rule of reason permits 
the prediction of results and the decision of cases by estimating the position 
of each fact complex along a single spectrum. Basic ideas of economics calibrate 
the spectrum 'for producers who must- estimate the risks of 'behavior and for 
courts who must decide cases. 
This virtue, too, is lacking -in a rule of reason which requires the court 
to decide from case to case whether the' spreading of business or 'some "ap- 
pealing" purpose, such as a particular benefit to specific producers, is or is 
not to justify a tax upon consumers or upon other producers. The method 
of choosing between specific producers and all consumers is not the subject 
of any social science, or at least not one with propositions and criteria match- 
ing those of economics. The choice in each case is between rival and incom- 
mensurable values; there is no continuous spectrum between' them. 
Courts can deal with uncertainty created -by the' absence of meaningful 
standards in several ways. One is to refuse to deal with the topic. A second 
is to declare the statute which contains inadequate standards unconstitutional. 
A third is to supply by interpretation the certainty that the statute lacks. The 
"first method is rarely open with respect to a statute. The second would have 
been a possibility with the Sherman Act,'but the courts of the main' tradition 
took the third route. They created a case law which used price theory, albeit 
a somewhat primitive brand, to give the 'law -the 'structure and criteria it 
needed. The Brandeis approach, however, lacks the requisite structure and 
criteria and would put the Sherman Act back in its original state of uncertainty. 
The point made here, is' not that the explicit adoption of the Brandeis rule 
of reason would necessarily render section 1 of the Sherman Act unconstitu- 
tional, though that would seem a possibility, but that it 'would create a kind 
of uncertainty that courts have usually refused to tolerate for extended periods. 
The argument is best illustrated, however, by cases in which the Supreme 
Court has dealt with statutes embodying essentially' Brandeisian standards 
(or nonstandards) in the constitutional context of the void-for-vagueness 
doctrine. The relevant cases are Nash v. United States,182 International Har- 
vester Co. v. Kentucky,'83 United States v. Cohen Grocery Co.,'84 Cline v. 
Frink Dairy Co.,185 Trenton Potteries, and United States v. National Dairy 
Products Corp.186 These cases discuss the problem of standards primarily 
from the viewpoint of the citizen who must obey a criminal law and who is 
constitutionally entitled to fair warning. Though that seems to be a valid 
consideration in itself, other cases, notably the reapportionment decisions, 
suggest that the problem of standards also relates to the ability of courts to 
182. 229 U.S. 373 (1913). 
183. 234 U.S. 216 (1914). 
184. 255 U.S. 81 (1921). 
185. 274 U.S. 445 (1927). 
186. 372 U.S. 29 (1963). 
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function in a judicial fashion. This may suggest that the need for standards 
is closely linked to the question of which organ of government shall make 
essentially political choices.187 
The Nash case involved a challenge to the Sherman Act for unconstitutional 
vagueness allegedly created by the reading given the law in the Standard Oil 
and American Tobacco cases. According to Justice Holmes' opinion for the 
Court, defendants' challenge was not that there were no standards but only 
that "the statute contains in its definition an element of degree as to which 
estimates may differ, with the result that a man might find himself in prison 
because his honest judgment did not anticipate that of a jury of less competent 
men." Holmes' answer was: 
But apart from the common law as to restraint of trade thus taken up 
by the statute [as shown by Standard Oil and American Tobacco] the law 
is full of instances where a man's fate depends on his estimating rightly, 
that is, as the jury subsequently estimates it, some matter of degree. If 
his judgment is wrong, not only may he incur a fine or short imprison- 
ment, as here; he may incur the penalty of death. "An act causing death 
may be murder, manslaughter, or misadventure according to the degree 
of danger attending it" by common experience in the circumstances known 
to the actor.188 
Holmes' remark about the statute taking up the common law is likely to 
be misleading unless read in the light of his remark in the preceding para- 
graph of the opinion that Standard Oil and American Tobacco "established 
that only such contracts and combinations are within the act as, by reason 
of intent or the inherent nature of the contemplated acts, prejudice the public 
interests by unduly restricting competition or unduly obstructing the course 
of trade."1'89 This is recognition that "restraint of trade" was to be interpreted 
in those economic terms which Holmes in Northern Securities had contended 
were largely lacking in the common law and hence in the statute.19? 
The constitutional difference that price theory makes may be seen by com- 
paring Nash with International Harvester, Cohen, and Cline. The statutes 
struck down in those cases all contained a kind of vagueness very similar 
to that inherent in the Brandeis version of the rule of reason. 
187. ... [W]hen the Court finds a statute unduly vague, it withholds adjudication of 
the substantive issue in order to set in motion the process of legislative decision. 
It does not hold that the legislature may not do whatever it is that is complained 
of but, rather, asks that the legislature do it, if it is to be done at all. 
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 152 (1962). 
188. 229 U.S. 373, 377. 
189. Id. at 376. 
190. It is, therefore, somewhat misleading to say, as Justice Frankfurter later did, 
that in Nash, "The vagueness of the Sherman Act was saved by imparting to it the gloss 
of history." Federal Trade Commission v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co., 344 
U.S. 392, 405 (1953) (dissenting opinion). The vagueness was saved initially in Trans- 
Missouri by imparting to the Act the gloss of economics that Chief Justice White later 
wrote into the history of the common law. 
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The International Harvester opinion, also written by Holmes, came in 1914, 
just a year after Nash. The Court there held invalid under the 14th Amend- 
ment's due process clause the antitrust laws of Kentucky under which de- 
fendant had been convicted, essentially, for having agreed to sell and for 
having sold harvesters at a price in excess of their "real value." The state 
courts had held that "real value" was "market value under fair competition, 
and under normal market conditions."'9' The result, Holmes pointed out, was 
to require the defendant combination to guess what the market price would 
have been if the combination had not been formed and nothing else violently 
affecting values had occurred. He found the problem beyond human ingenuity. 
"The reason is not the general uncertainties of a jury trial but that the ele- 
ments necessary to determine the imaginary ideal are uncertain both in nature 
and degree of effect to the acutest commercial mind."'192 The decision was con- 
sistent with Nash's upholding of the Sherman Act which, Holmes said, went 
"no further than to recognize that, as with negligence, between the two ex- 
tremes of the obviously illegal and the plainly lawful there is a gradual approach 
and that the complexity of life makes it impossible to draw a line in advance 
without an artificial simplification that would be unjust. The conditions are 
as permanent as anything human, and a great body of precedents on the civil 
side coupled with familiar practice make it comparatively easy for common 
sense to keep to what is safe."198 
The conditions Holmes called "as permanent as anything human" seem to 
be the principles of economics, and the contrast he draws is one between a 
law that employs those principles and common business sense to mark the 
degrees between competition and monopoly and a law that uses a "real value" 
test for which, like a reasonable-price test, there are no standards. The Ken- 
tucky statute held invalid thus employed a test similar to White's 1897 reason- 
able price test and to Brandeis' open class of appealing objectives. 
The 1921 Cohen decision made even clearer the contrast in constitutional 
validity between the economic criteria of the main tradition and the vague 
subjective criteria of the Brandeis tradition. That case struck down under 
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments section 4 of the Lever Act, a federal criminal 
statute, which provided: "That it is hereby made unlawful for any person 
willfully . . . to make any unjust or unreasonable rate or change in handling 
or dealing in or with any necessaries; to conspire, combine, agree, or arrange 
with any other person .. . (e) to exact excessive prices for any necessaries . . ." 
Chief Justice White, who had given the rule of reason its final phrasing in 
the 1911 cases, wrote the opinion for the Court striking down this provision 
for reasons that are applicable equally to the Brandeis approach and to his 
own position in Trans-Missouri: 
Observe that the section forbids no specific or definite act. It confines 
the subject-matter of the investigation which it authorizes to no element 
191. 234 U.S. 216, 221. 
192. Id. at 223. 
193. Ibid. 
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essentially inhering in the transaction as to which it provides. It leaves 
open, therefore, the widest conceivable inquiry, the scope of which no one 
can foreshadow or adequately guard against. In fact, we see no reason 
to doubt the soundness of the observation of the court below, in its opinion, 
to the effect that, to attempt to enforce the section would be the exact 
equivalent of an effort to carry out a statute which in terms merely 
penalized and punished all acts detrimental to the public interest when 
unjust and unreasonable in the estimation of the court and jury.194 
Brandeis' approach to the Sherman Act, with its direction to the judge to 
decide whether or not the purpose or effect of a restraint is appealing, pre- 
cisely corresponds to the description of the invalid statute in the passage 
above as penalizing "all acts detrimental to the public interest when unjust 
and unreasonable in the estimation of the court and jury." Brandeis, unfor- 
tunately, did not reach the constitutional issue in Cohen, concurring in the 
result by construing the provision of the Lever Act under review not to cover 
the case before the Court. 
Two 1927 decisions, Cline and Trenton Potteries, further illustrate the 
problem. The Cline opinion, written by Chief Justice Taft, held the Colorado 
Anti-Trust Act unconstitutionally vague because it made the lawfulness of 
certain conspiracies and combinations turn upon a determination of "reason- 
able profit."'195 Trenton Potteries, which preceded Cline, similarly made the 
constitutional value of price theory clear. In addition to disapproving of Bran- 
deis' dictum in Chicago Board of Trade, Justice Stone attempted to state 
limitations on the criteria or values subsumed under the rule of reason. Noting 
that the Standard Oil and American Tobacco decisions held that only un- 
reasonable restraints were prohibited by the Sherman Act, he said, 
194. 255 U.S. 81, 89 (1921). 
195. The fatal uncertainty was created by two provisos to the statute. According to 
Taft's reading, 
These provisos make the line between lawfulness and criminality to depend upon, 
first what commodities need to be handled according to the trust methods condemned 
in the first part of the Act to enable those engaged in dealing in them to secure a 
reasonable profit therefrom; second to determine what generally would be a rea- 
sonable profit for such a business; and third, what would be a reasonable profit for 
the defendant under the circumstances of his particular business. 
274 U.S. 445, 456-57. 
Taft quoted at length from his own opinion in Addyston Pipe & Steel concerning the 
impropriety of a reasonable price standard, indicating that he saw not only policy but con- 
stitutional objections to a law which required courts to say "in respect to contracts which 
have no other purpose and no other consideration on either side than the mutual restraint 
of the parties, how much restraint of competition is in the public interest, and how much 
is not." This, of course, is precisely what Brandeis' view in Chicago Board of Trade re- 
quired. Brandeis, however, voted with the Court in Cline. 
In the Cline opinion Taft sometimes did attribute the Sherman Act's sufficient definite- 
ness to the fact that it incorporated the common law precedent, but it must be remembered 
that Taft in Addyston Pipe & Steel had forced a policy orientation on recalcitrant com- 
mon law cases in order to achieve a result essentially indistinguishable from that Peckham 
had achieved by disregarding the common law and that White had arrived at by discern- 
ing a supposed underlying body of "practical conceptions" in the common law. 
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it does not follow that agreements to fix or maintain prices are reason- 
able restraints and therefore permitted by the statute, merely because the 
prices themselves are reasonable. Reasonableness is not a concept of 
definite and unchanging content. Its meaning necessarily varies in the 
different fields of the law, because it is used as a convenient summary 
of the dominant considerations which control in the application of legal 
doctrines. Our view of what is a reasonable restraint of commerce is 
controlled by the recognized purpose of the Sherman Law itself. Whether 
this type of restraint is reasonable or not must be judged in part at least, 
in the light of its effect on competition ... 18 
The question left open by this passage is what other considerations are 
allowed by the phrase "in part at least" in the last sentence. We have seen 
the need for a criterion to balance that of promoting competition. Light is 
thrown on the constitutional specifications of the necessary counterweight 
by the reasons Stone gave for rejecting the reasonable price approach. He 
rejected it, he said, both because it would place too great a burden of ad- 
ministration and enforcement on the government, and because 
in the absence of express legislation requiring it, we should hesitate to 
adopt a construction making the difference between legal and illegal 
conduct in the field of business relations depend upon so uncertain a 
test as whether prices are reasonable - a determination which can be 
satisfactorily made only after a complete survey of our economic organi- 
zation and a choice between rival philosophies. Compare U.S. v. Cohen 
Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81; International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 
234 U.S. 216; Nash v. United States, supra.197 
Two of the citations were, of course, to cases in which the Court had been 
unwilling to adopt so uncertain a test even in the presence of express legis- 
lation requiring it. It would seem, moreover, that Stone's objection to the 
reasonable price test requires that any other value or criterion entering into 
the test of reasonableness must be commensurable with that of "effect on com- 
petition." Otherwise a court could not weigh the two without becoming in- 
volved in "a choice between rival philosophies." Clearly the Brandeis rule of 
reason which Stone had emphatically rejected involves the attempt to com- 
pare incommensurables - a choice between rival philosophies - because 
it involves a choice between producers and consumers. Though Stone did 
not draw the conclusion, only by making the policy of the law the creation 
of wealth can the essential commensurable concept - efficiency be found 
to balance against "effect on competition." The predictability thus introduced 
into the Sherman Act by the Peckham-Taft-White tradition constitutes the 
difference in result between Nash and Trenton Potteries, on the one hand, 
and, on the other, International Harvester, Cohen, and Cline. 
It has been suggested that the void-for-vagueness doctrine has usually been 
employed by the Supreme Court to create an added zone of protection around 
196. 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927). 
197. Id. at 398. 
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certain Bill of Rights freedoms.198 International Harvester and Cohen are, 
under this view, reduced in large part to the status of historical curiosities left 
over from "an era when economic laissez faire was for the Court the sanctum 
sanctorum that free speech has become today."'99 Since economic freedom is 
not noticeably a sanctum sanctorum for the present Court, this theory may 
be read too broadly to mean that uncertainty in an antitrust statute, even a 
criminal antitrust statute such as the Sherman Act, would not today cause 
great concern, and, therefore, that Brandeis' rule of reason might now be 
acceptable. The Court's 1963 decision in United States v. National Dairy 
Products Corp.,200 however, indicates that this is not the case, and that the 
Court continues to refuse to tolerate lack of standards, even in an economic 
regulation. 
The district court in National Dairy had dismissed an indictment laid under 
section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act, which makes it a crime to sell goods 
at "unreasonably low prices for the purpose of destroying competition or elimi- 
nating a competitor," on the ground that the statute was unconstitutionally 
vague and indefinite. A majority of the Supreme Court reversed, but read 
the statute to prohibit sales below cost made with a predatory intent.201 This 
was the familiar judicial device - an alternative to a declaration of unconsti- 
tutional vagueness - of gaining the necessary statutory certainty through 
interpretation.202 
The National Dairy opinion distinguished Cohen because neither the statute 
nor the indictment there specified a definite act that was prohibited, and, 
Moreover, the standard held too vague in Cohen was without a meaning- 
ful referent in business practice or usage . . . . In view of the business 
practices against which section 3 was unmistakably directed and the 
specificity of the violations charged in the indictment here, both absent 
in Cohen, the preferred analogy to that case must be rejected.203 
198. Amsterdam, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. 
L. REV. 67, 75 (1960). 
199. Id. at 77. 
200. 372 U.S. 29 (1963). 
201. To the objection that the standard of "below cost" was itself unconstitutionally 
vague, the Court replied that it did not have to decide this point on appeal from the grant- 
ing of a pretrial motion because it might develop at trial that National Dairy had sold 
below any type of cost the words might indicate. 
202. The majority opinion analogized its tactic here to that employed in Screws v. 
United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945), which read a requirement of specific intent into a federal 
statute making it a crime willfully to subject, under color of state law, any inhabitant of 
a state "to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by 
the Constitution or laws of the United States" in order to save the law from fatal vague- 
ness. 
203. 372 U.S. at 36. Justice Clark's opinion for the majority, while it does not bear 
out the idea that International Harvester, Cohen, and Cline can be relegated to an his- 
torical ashpile, does suggest that the vagueness problems may be approached differently in 
cases involving economic regulation and those involving First Amendment problems. In 
the latter, he said, the Court is 
concerned with the vagueness of the statute "on its face" because such vagueness 
may in itself deter constitutionally protected and socially desirable conduct . . . 
846 THE YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol.74:775 
The constitutional importance of economic theory is again shown by the 
suggestion that a "meaningful referrent in business practice or usage" existed 
for section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act but not for the Lever Act. The 
distinction seems to rest on the assumption that there is an economic theory 
which distinguishes predatory price cutting from other kinds of price cutting 
but none which distinguishes unreasonable from reasonable rates. 
The Court's method of narrowing section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act 
as applied in the particular case may not be a wholly satisfactory solution to 
the vagueness of that statute, but it demonstrates the continuance of real con- 
cern over the problem of vagueness even when the freedoms at stake are 
economic. This suggests that it is not entirely the quality of the freedom 
that impels the Court but also the problem of vagueness itself. The point is 
emphasized by the fact that Justice Black, dissenting in an opinion in which 
Justices Stewart and Goldberg joined, - a group that cannot be described 
as committed to economic laissez faire as a constitutional value - contended 
that section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act was flatly unconstitutional under 
the rule established in Cohen. 
That the judicial need for standards goes deeper even than the constitutional 
requirement of fair warning is suggested by the historical progression of the 
Supreme Court's treatment of the problem of state legislative reapportion- 
ment. A large element in the resistance of some members of the Court to 
its entry into that field was the inherent lack of 
accepted legal standards or criteria or even reliable analogies to draw 
upon for making judicial judgments. To charge courts with the task of 
accommodating the incommensurable factors of policy . . . is to attribute, 
however flatteringly, omnicompetence to judges.204 
Notice was taken of "the caution not to undertake decision where standards 
meet for judicial judgment are lacking."205 
It may be significant that when the Court did undertake the reapportion- 
ment of state legislatures it moved speedily to the only firm criterion available 
- "one person, one vote"206 - which had the overwhelming virtue, despite 
considerable defects as history or as political or constitutional theory,20T of 
being at least a standard. 
No such factor is present here where the statute is directed only at conduct designed 
to destroy competition, activity which is neither constitutionally protected nor so- 
cially desirable. 
Thus, the Court would judge a statute impinging upon First Amendment freedoms for the 
definiteness or lack of it that it displayed on its face but would look at section 3 of the 
Robinson-Patman Act not only in terms of the statute "on its face" but also in the light 
of the conduct to which it is applied. 
Put in terms of the degree of danger of deterring socially desirable conduct, this dis- 
tinction between statutes aimed at unwanted speech and at excessive price competition may 
be somewhat shaky, but it does suggest a different approach to the void-for-vagueness 
doctrine when constitutional values are close by. 
204. Frankfurter, dissenting, in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 268 (1962). 
205. Id. at 289. 
206. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963). 
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The Brandeis rule of reason lacks "standards meet for judicial judgment" 
and it is, therefore, to be expected that the explicit, full-scale adoption of that 
approach would create uncertainties which the courts would not long tolerate. 
The progression of the legislative reapportionment cases suggests that a con- 
scious adoption by the courts of the Brandeis rule of reason would shortly be 
followed by the evolution of arbitrary rules concerning the purposes for whcih 
cartelization is allowable. 
Peckham, Taft, and White, when they first dealt with the vague language 
of the Sherman Act, faced a problem not unlike that posed for the Court by 
the statutes involved in International Harvester, Cohen, Cline, National Dairy, 
and by the topic of legislative reapportionment. Their solution was to employ 
the standards provided by the basic ideas of price theory to give the law re- 
lating to agreed eliminations of competition the standards required. Standards, 
though of varying degrees of merit, were similarly found in National Dairy 
and in the field of legislative reapportionment. No standards were at hand 
to be incorporated by interpretation in International Harvester., Cohen and 
Cline, and so the statutes there fell. 
The arguments made above concerning the unreality of the distinctions of 
the Brandeis approach, the relative effectiveness of the Sherman Act in im- 
plementing the different values of the law's two traditions, and the respective 
roles of legislatures and courts in choosing values and making interpersonal 
comparisons, indicate that the criteria of the main tradition which give cer- 
tainty to the Sherman Act are vastly superior to those that could be created 
by judicial interpretation within the Brandeis tradition.208 
If it is true that the Brandeis rule of reason as a whole represents an im- 
proper approach for the courts, it should not require further agument that 
those elements of it which intermittently appear in decisions and enforcement 
policy are illegitimate and should be eliminated. In considering the correct 
treatment of the various forms of price fixing, market division, and analogous 
eliminations of competition by agreement with which the law must cope, 
therefore, the second part of this paper will confine itself to the policy approach 
of the law's main tradition. 
207. See Neal, Baker v. Carr: Politics in Search of Law, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 252. 
208. An additional element of the main tradition's superiority, related to the fair warn- 
ing concept, is that the law may be corrected with less likelihood of unfairness to persons 
who have relied upon prior decisions. A court attempting to apply the economic criteria of 
the main tradition may, of course, mistakenly approve a disguised cartel. Nevertheless, 
persons who subsequently make similar agreements may be presumed to know the actual 
purpose and effect of their arrangements. Their reliance, therefore, can only be upon the 
continued incorrect application of known principles. The Brandeis rule of reason seems to 
have greater stress upon stare decisis, and so greater rigidity, built into its doctrines. Pro- 
ducers would often be invited to rely upon decisions that certain kinds of elimination of 
competition are desirable in and of themselves. A later court might find the attractiveness 
of such cartelization less obvious, but it would surely feel less free to correct the law be- 
cause it could not truthfully say that persons who had relied upon the prior case should 
have known it was incorrectly decided. 
